In regard to Gal Oya, boundaries and membership have been clearly designated, congruent rules have been devised and monitored, and collective-choice arenas have been set up. Until the rights of farmers are clearly recognized and guaranteed and conflict-resolution mechanisms are in place, however, I am unwilling to assume that these are robust institutions. Given the long history of central control, it would be difficult for farmers in Gal Oya to continue their organized efforts if a major change in the Irrigation Department were to place in office engineers who presumed that local farmers had little to offer. The fragile cases stand as intermediate cases in terms of the design principles. Enough of the principles are in use to enable appropriators to solve some of their immediate CPR problems, but one would be hesitant to predict institutional endurance unless further institutional development occurs and the arrangements come closer to meeting the full set of design principles.

The cases discussed in this volume compose a limited set. Further empirical and theoretical work is needed before one can have a high degree of confidence that this set of design principles is the best way to distinguish among robust, fragile, and failed institutions. Several colleagues and I currently are collecting information on a large set of empirical cases to determine if the pattern of relationships shown on Table 5.2 is replicated. An initial explanation of why these design principles would be associated with robust institutions was presented in Chapter 3. Sufficient support for those initial theoretical speculations is presented in Table 5.2 that further theoretical and empirical analyses appear warranted.
In Chapter 1, I discussed three models that are used to justify the policy recommendation that external governmental authorities should impose solutions on individuals who jointly use CPRs: Hardin's tragedy of the commons, the prisoner's dilemma game, and Mancur Olson's logic of collective action. All three models lead to the prediction that those using such resources will not cooperate so as to achieve collective benefits. Further, individuals are perceived as being trapped in a static situation, unable to change the rules affecting their incentives.

The cases presented in this study are from a universe of relatively small scale CPRs (the largest involves about 15,000 appropriators), each located within a single country. The appropriators in these cases are heavily dependent on a flow of scarce resource units for economic returns. The cases illustrate that some, but not all, appropriators in these settings solve what are thought to be second-order dilemmas to provide their own institutions. Various institutional arrangements are devised to accomplish these results. Marketable rights to the flow of resource units were developed in Alicante and in three of the California groundwater cases, but the resource systems themselves did not become private property. Forms of public instrumentalities were also used in the California groundwater cases and several other cases, but none of the success cases involved direct regulation by a centralized authority.

Most of the institutional arrangements used in the success stories were rich mixtures of public and private instrumentalities. If this study does nothing more than shatter the convictions of many policy analysts that the only way to solve CPR problems is for external authorities to impose full private property rights or centralized regulation, it will have accomplished one major purpose. At the same time, no claim is made that institutional arrangements supplied by appropriators, rather than by external authorities, will achieve optimal solutions. The Mojave case clearly illustrates this point. But the survival, over long periods of time, of the resources described in Chapters 3 and 4, as well as the institutions for governing those resources, is testimony to the achievement of at least a minimal level of "solution."

This study has an additional purpose beyond challenging the presumption that universal institutional panaceas must be imposed by external authorities to solve smaller-scale, but still complex, uncertain, and difficult, problems. The observation that the world is more complex than it is presented in these models is obvious, and not useful by itself. What is needed is further theoretical development that can help identify variables that must be included in any effort to explain and predict when appropriators using smaller-scale CPRs are more likely to self-organize and effectively govern their own CPRs, and when they are more likely to fail. Such theoretical development not only should provide more useful models but also, and more important, should give us a general framework that can help to direct analysts' attention to important variables to be taken into account in empirical and theoretical work.

The models described in Chapter 1 are not wrong. When conditions in the world approximate the conditions assumed in the models, observed behaviors and outcomes can be expected to approximate predicted behaviors and outcomes. When individuals who have high discount rates and little mutual trust act independently, without the capacity to communicate, to enter into binding agreements, and to arrange for monitoring and enforcing mechanisms, they are not likely to choose jointly beneficial strategies unless such strategies happen to be their dominant strategies. The collapse of the Pacific sardine fishery (McHugh 1972) and the collapse of the Antarctic blue whale fishery (Clark 1977) are tragic testimony to the capacity of these models to predict outcomes in empirical situations approximating the theoretical conditions.

Instead of being wrong, these are special models that utilize extreme assumptions rather than general theories. These models can successfully predict strategies and outcomes in fixed situations approximating the initial conditions of the models, but they cannot predict outcomes outside that range. They are useful for predicting behavior in large-scale CPRs in which no one communicates, everyone acts independently, no attention is paid to the effects of one's actions, and the costs of trying to change the structure of the situation are high. They are far less useful for characterizing the behavior of appropriators in the smaller-scale CPRs that are the focus of this inquiry. In such situations, individuals repeatedly communi-
cave and interact with one another in a localized physical setting. Thus, it is possible that they can learn whom to trust, what effects their actions will have on each other and on the CPR, and how to organize themselves to gain benefits and avoid harm. When individuals have lived in such situations for a substantial time and have developed shared norms and patterns of reciprocity, they possess social capital with which they can build institutional arrangements for resolving CPR dilemmas.

When models that assume no communication and no capacity to change the rules are applied to the smaller-scale CPRs, they are applied out of their range. Applying models out of range can produce more harm than good. Public policies based on the notion that all CPR appropriators are helpless and must have rules imposed on them can destroy institutional capital that has been accumulated during years of experience in particular locations, as illustrated by the Nova Scotian fishery cases.

That models are used metaphorically in applications to a wide diversity of situations, rather than to a limited set of conditions, should not be blamed entirely on policy analysts and public officials. Fads and fashions sweep through academia as well as elsewhere. Among many academics there are strong preferences for tight analytical models that will yield clear predictions. To make a model tractable, theorists must make simplifying assumptions. Many of these assumptions are equivalent to setting a parameter (e.g., the amount of information available to participants, or the extent of communication) equal to a constant (e.g., complete information, or no communication). Because the resulting model appears to be relatively simple, with only a few “moving parts,” it may be considered by some to be general, rather than the special model that it is. Apparent simplicity and generality are not, however, equivalent. Setting a variable equal to a constant usually narrows, rather than broadens, the range of applicability of a model.

Further, policies based on models that represent the structures of situations as unchanging or exogenously fixed, even if repeated, lead to policy recommendations that someone external to the situation must change the structure. The analyst attempting to make a clear prediction about equilibria must hold some variables constant (and thus exogenous) while exploring the effects of a limited number of endogenous variables conceived to be under the control of those in the situation. These models demonstrate what individuals will do when they are in a situation that they cannot change. We do not learn from these models what individuals will do when they have autonomy and can craft their own institutions and can affect each other’s norms and perceived benefits. Nor do we learn how the capacity of innovators to develop institutions that can lead them toward better, rather than worse, outcomes for themselves and for others might be enhanced or inhibited by the structures of the institutional arrangements of the surrounding political regime. It would, of course, be possible to develop models to describe how individuals can change the structure of the situation they face over time, but current policy analyses are based on the static models discussed in Chapter 1.

Analyzing the in-depth case studies can deepen one’s appreciation of human artisanship in shaping and reshaping the very situations within which individuals must make decisions and bear the consequences of actions taken on a day-to-day basis. The appropriators in Alanya, Torbel, the Japanese mountain villages, Valencia, Llocos Norte, the California groundwater basins, and even Mawelle all transformed the structures they faced, moving from a structure in which a set of unorganized individuals made independent decisions about using a CPR that yielded scarce resource units to a structure in which a set of organized individuals made decisions in a sequential, contingent, or frequency-dependent manner. The Sri Lankan farmers living on the large settlements were not able to transform the structure of incentives that they faced until external agents initiated small-scale changes that eventually were used as the foundation for major institutional changes. The fishers of Bodrum and the Bay of Izmir continue to experience rent dissipation and appear unable to change the structure of the situation they face. The desert dwellers of Mojave may mine their underground basin dry, even though they tried to solve appropriation and provision problems by devising new, but inappropriate, institutions.

**The Problems of Supply, Credible Commitment, and Mutual Monitoring**

Why is it that some appropriators can supply themselves with new rules, gain quasi-voluntary compliance with those rules, and monitor each other’s conformance to the rules, whereas others cannot? As discussed in Chapter 2, institutional supply, credible commitment, and mutual monitoring are not easily explained using current institutional theories. In Chapter 3, I offered an initial explanation for credible commitments and mutual monitoring in which CPR rules conform to a set of design principles. The explanation also draws heavily on the assumptions made in Chapter 2 about fallible, norm-adopting individuals who pursue contingent strategies in complex and uncertain environments. Such individuals can be expected to make contingent commitments to follow rules that

- define a set of appropriators who are authorized to use a CPR (design principle 1),
relate to the specific attributes of the CPR and the community of appropriators using the CPR (design principle 2),
are designed, at least in part, by local appropriators (design principle 3),
are monitored by individuals accountable to local appropriators (design principle 4), and
are sanctioned using graduated punishments (design principle 5).

When individuals are presented with rules meeting these criteria, a safe, advantageous, and credible commitment can be made. The commitment is to follow the rules so long as (1) most similarly situated individuals adopt the same commitment and (2) the long-term expected net benefits to be achieved by this strategy are greater than the long-term expected net benefits for individuals following short-term, dominant strategies. This is an advantageous strategy, because if most individuals follow it, they will be better off than they would be following short-term, dominant strategies. It is safe in that individuals following it cannot be exploited for long by others who break their commitments. If more than a minimal level of rule-breaking occurs, any individual following this contingent strategy can adjust his or her rate of rule conformance downward until the rule-following behavior of others returns to an acceptable level. An announced self-commitment to follow such a strategy—"I will if you will"—is credible when there is monitoring, because each person knows that unprovoked deviations are likely to be discovered. When an individual's rule infractions are discovered, the probability increases that others will reduce their rates of rule conformance to the detriment of that individual.

Because sanctions are graduated, individuals who commit themselves to a contingent strategy also know that if an emergency were to occur, in which following the rules would be disastrous, an occasional deviation would be subjected to only a small fine or other punishment. Similarly, an individual who makes an occasional error will face moderate sanctions. The imposition of some sanctions reassures the rule-breaker that deviations by others are also likely to be discovered. The way in which rules are enforced is forgiving of occasional lapses or errors and allows appropriators to avoid the high costs that can result from rigid application of uniform rules in a changing and uncertain environment. Continued rule infractions, however, will lead to an increase in the severity of sanctions.

If occasional rule infractions are not discovered, the rule-breaker is even better off in the short run. However, if one were to break the rules several times without discovery, one might revise one's commitment of the current monitoring system in deterring others from similar infractions. That would lead an occasional rule-breaker to adopt a higher rate of rule-breaking behavior. Obviously, as undetected rule infractions become more frequent and CPR conditions become worse, the higher will be the probability that other individuals will increase their rates of rule-breaking behavior. Unless monitoring efforts are increased to reverse this trend, rule compliance will cascade downward. Thus, monitoring and graduated sanctions are necessary to keep the rate of rule-following high enough to avoid triggering a process in which higher rates of rule infractions fuel subsequent increases in rates of rule infractions.

Making a contingent rule-following commitment requires that individuals obtain information about the rates of rule conformance adopted by others. Otherwise, an individual cannot wisely pursue this contingent strategy. One way to obtain this information is to serve as a monitor from time to time. When the rules in use conform to the design principles discussed in Chapter 3 (enabling individuals to design rules that will keep monitoring costs low) and individuals adopt contingent strategies, individuals are also motivated to monitor each other to obtain the information they need to pursue this contingent strategy. Similarly, if individuals begin monitoring others and learn that others comply most of the time with a set of rules, they are more likely to be willing to adopt and/or continue contingent strategies.

Adopting contingent strategies enhances the likelihood of monitoring. Monitoring enhances the probability of adopting contingent strategies. Adding the capacity to use graduated sanctions initially for their informational value and eventually for their deterrence value, one can begin to understand how a complex configuration of rules used by strategic individuals helps to solve both the problems of commitment and the problems of mutual monitoring. The weight of the explanation does not fall on a single variable. Where individuals follow rules and engage in mutual monitoring, reinforcing institutional arrangements and individual strategies bolster one another so as to maintain enduring patterns of consistent, but not perfect, rule-following behavior. What remains unexplained is how some appropriators overcome, and others do not overcome, the problems associated with collective provision of delicately calibrated institutions that create situations in which individuals find it advantageous, credible, and safe to pursue contingent commitments to rule compliance and mutual monitoring. Initial aspects of an explanation for institutional supply were presented at the end of Chapter 4, where the incremental, sequential, and self-transforming nature of institutional supply was analyzed in the context of a facilitative political regime. Most of the failure cases presented in Chapter 5 showed a different picture in which individuals were unable, because of internal and external
variables, to overcome the problems of collective provision of new rules. Recent efforts to modify the theory of collective action to explain the achievement of collective benefits by individuals acting independently have focused almost entirely on variables that are internal to the situation. One or more of the following variables are consistently shown to influence outcomes:

1. the total number of decision makers,
2. the number of participants minimally necessary to achieve the collective benefit,
3. the discount rate in use,
4. similarities of interests, and
5. the presence of participants with substantial leadership or other assets.

These same variables are relevant to an explanation of the supply of institutions, because this is clearly a problem of collective action. Several of the cases can be explained using this set of variables alone. In Alanya, a relatively small number of fishers (100) who planned to live and fish in Alanya for many years (low discount rate) and who had very similar interests (all used the same technology) were able to organize and devise new rules, even though no one had substantial assets. In Bodrum and the Bay of Izmir, larger numbers of fishers (400 and 1,700), some of whom lived locally and some of whom came from some distance to fish there (disparate discount rates), and who had dissimilar interests (many different types of technologies in use, and four to six subgroups in each) were not able to organize and devise new rules, even though some of them had substantial assets.

But several anomalies exist. The numbers of appropriators in two of the successful groundwater basins were quite large (700 and 750), the disparity of interests was substantial, and discount rates were relatively high, given all of the alternative opportunities available to entrepreneurs. The numbers of irrigators in the Spanish huertas were even larger (2,400, 4,800, 13,300, and 13,500), and the systems were large enough that upstream and downstream differences were substantial. Although the number of major groundwater producers who together could have made a substantial difference in groundwater conditions was less than the total number of pumpers, a similar relationship did not hold in the Spanish huertas. At the other extreme, the number of fishers in Mawelle was just over 200, and all had similar interests and low discount rates. Neither leadership nor the type of production function helps to account for the differences in results.

The most frequently used theories of collective action are too sparse and too difficult to interpret to be fully satisfactory as foundations for effective policy analysis of institutional change. By "too sparse," I mean that key internal and external variables needed to explain self-organization are missing from the consideration. By "difficult to interpret," I mean that the theories do not yield clear implications for recommending public policies. What policy implications should one draw, for example, from knowing that the size of a group increases the difficulty of organizing collective action? Should one simply presume that small groups will take care of themselves, and that external authorities will have to govern and manage the CPRs used by larger groups? The anomalous cases illustrate that this is an inappropriate implication.

Let us take another look at the larger CPRs (within the universe of cases considered) and how those that have succeeded in solving problems of collective action have done so. All of these are characterized by design principle 8: the use of nested enterprises. The larger organizational units in these systems are built on previously organized smaller units. In the Spanish huertas, the fundamental organizational unit is the tertiary canal. The cost of organizing a group of farmers living near to one another and appropriating directly from the same canal is considerably less than the cost of organizing a large group of farmers many of whom never come into direct contact with one another. But once the smaller units are organized, the marginal cost of building on that organizational base is substantially less than the cost of starting with no prior base. Several of the Spanish huertas are three or four layers deep.

In the Philippine federation of zanjaras, the smallest unit is a work team of 5 to 10 members. Each of the individual zanjaras, comprising 20 to 75 members, is organized independently. Only after these units were in place did they federate into a larger unit. In the very large agricultural settlements in Sri Lanka, efforts to organize the farmers failed until the ARTI/Cornell team started to organize small, face-to-face groups of farmers to solve small problems that could be tackled effectively through ad hoc cooperation. Only after those first efforts to organize small, ad hoc groups of neighboring farmers were successful did they move to establish formal organizations of the farmers sharing field canals. Eventually the system that evolved in Gal Oya was four layers deep.

In the Raymond, West, and Central basins, the first step was the creation of a small, voluntary private association that enabled producers to obtain and disseminate accurate information about the condition of their resource. From there, several further enterprises were established, each built on the substructure that had already been created. Pumpers were able to call on public facilities — courts, a state department of natural resources, legislatures, special elections — to obtain information and to engage in
A framework for analysis of CPRs

most transactions are costly. Why individuals monitor each other’s rule conformance would be difficult to explain using the assumption of complete information.

To summarize the foregoing discussion, there are three problems with the current theories of collective action that reduce their usefulness for providing a foundation for policy analysis of institutional change in small-scale CPRs. Current theories do not take into account

1. the need to reflect the incremental, self-transforming nature of institutional change,
2. the importance of the characteristics of external political regimes in an analysis of how internal variables affect levels of collective provision of rules, and
3. the need to include information and transaction costs.

Having recognized these problems, we can next ask how to start bridging the gap between current theories of collective action and empirical instances of collective action in CPR situations so as to move toward the development of more relevant theories of institutional change for policy analysis.

What is needed in the development of useful theory for the analysis of CPR situations— as well as many other important policy questions— is a somewhat different orientation toward the theoretical endeavor related to policy analysis. Clear analytical models provide an important part of the theoretical foundation for good policy analysis, but not the entire foundation. To get clear results from a model, some variables are omitted or consciously or unconsciously held constant. Models suggest to the analyst likely behaviors and outcomes in a situation with a particular structure. They do not tell the analyst how to discover the structure of the situation in order to conduct an analysis. Models that use assumptions such as complete information, independent action, perfect symmetry, no human errors, no norms of acceptable behavior, zero monitoring and enforcement costs, and no capacity to change the structure of the situation itself help the analyst derive precise predictions.

Models that make such assumptions do not, however, direct the attention of the policy analyst to some of the problematic variables of the situation that affect the incentives and behaviors of individuals. Assuming complete information about participant behavior does not push the analyst to examine how individuals in field settings obtain information, who has what information, and whether or not information is biased. Assuming independent action does not push the analyst to ask if individuals take into account the effects of their actions on the choices made by others. Assum-
Governing the commons

ing zero-cost monitoring does not push the analyst to examine cost and effectiveness for various monitoring rules. Assuming fixed structure does not push the analyst to examine whether or not and how individuals change their own rules and how the surrounding political regime enhances or inhibits institutional change.

Frameworks that relate whole families of models together also provide an important part of the theoretical foundation for policy analysis, because they point to the set of variables and the types of relationships among variables that need to be examined in conducting any theoretical or empirical study of a particular type of phenomenon. From a framework, one does not derive a precise prediction. From a framework, one derives the questions that need to be asked to clarify the structure of a situation and the incentives facing individuals. Once the incentives are clarified, the theorist can analyze a situation and predict likely behavior in terms of choice of strategy and the consequences that are likely to result.

Consequently, instead of building a specific model of institutional supply, I shall develop a framework to summarize the lessons to be learned from examining successful and unsuccessful efforts by CPR appropriators to change their institutions. The framework identifies sets of variables that are most likely to affect decisions about continuing or changing rules. The framework can be used by theorists to develop more precise theories, and models of theories, of institutional choice. It can also be used to organize further empirical research to generate findings about the relative importance of particular variables in the context of other configurations of variables.

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE

Institutional-choice situations, both constitutional-choice and collective-choice situations, as defined in Chapter 2, affect the rules used in operational situations. Decisions made in collective-choice situations directly affect operational situations. Decisions made in constitutional-choice situations indirectly affect operational situations by creating and limiting the powers that can be exercised within collective-choice arrangements (creating legislative and judicial bodies, protecting rights of free speech and property, etc.) and by affecting the decision regarding who is represented and with what weight in collective-choice decisions. Rather than examining constitutional-choice and collective-choice processes separately, I refer to both when I use the term "institutional-choice situation."

To analyze an institutional-choice situation, one needs to view it from the perspective of the individuals making choices about future operational rules. Individuals who make institutional choices also make operational choices. When individuals face the question whether to retain or change status quo rules, the situation changes, but the individuals remain the same. Thus, one should use a similar conception of the individual when thinking about operational and institutional choices. In Chapter 2, I use a general conception of rational action involving four internal variables - expected benefits, expected costs, internalized norms, and discount rates - that affect individual choices of strategies in any situation. Individuals are perceived as weighing expected benefits and costs in making decisions as these are affected by internal norms and discount rates. Using this concept of rational action, one predicts that individuals will select strategies whose expected benefits will exceed expected costs. Without knowledge of the situational variables that affect benefits and costs, such a prediction is vacuous. This general conception of rational action places most of the explanatory weight on situational variables, rather than on assumptions made about the internal calculation process.

In an institutional-choice situation, as shown in Figure 6.1, the basic alternatives available to an individual are (1) to support the continuance of the status quo rules or (2) to support a change in one or more of the status quo rules. Although more than one alternative may be considered at a time, the ultimate decision is between an alternative set of rules and the status quo rules.

Figure 6.1. Summary of variables affecting institutional choice.
The costs of devoting 50 days to the zanjera are poignantly apparent to any farmer trying to support a family. Further, it is also quite apparent how his agricultural yield responds to communal irrigation. The amount of labor contributed by each farmer is recorded in an attendance book kept by the zanjera secretary, but because they are not paid for this labor, it is not recorded elsewhere. Nor is the food produced for consumption recorded in market transactions. Individuals who are closely involved in such situations can make accurate judgments about the costs and benefits of alternative rules systems, taking into account a variety of monetized and non-monetized benefits and costs. Individuals located in an administrative center will find it far more difficult to make good judgments about alternative rules, because many of these costs and benefits are not recorded and summarized in the information available to those external to the situation.

The second condition is equivalent to stating that individuals are attentive to all available information and know how to weight that information in an unbiased manner. If both the first and second conditions were met, subjective benefits and costs would closely approximate objective benefits and costs. The third condition is equivalent to stating that individuals do not behave opportunistically in order to try to obtain benefits greater than those obtainable through straightforward behavior. This condition implies that individuals reveal their evaluations honestly, contribute to collective benefits whenever formulas exist for equitably assigning costs, and are willing to invest time and resources in finding solutions to joint problems. If this condition were met, some of the strategic behavior posited to occur in all social dilemmas would disappear.

Unfortunately for the analyst, few field settings are characterized by these three conditions, or even one or two of them. Variables such as the benefits of using an alternative set of rules or the costs of monitoring and enforcing a set of rules are rarely recorded in a form that an analyst (or the individuals making institutional choices) can resolve by simple computation. Consequently, one must go beyond the summary variables intended to be used in policy settings to the situational variables that affect them.

Evaluating benefits

Let me illustrate this process by discussing the situational variables that affect the summary variable "information about net benefits of alternative rules." For a participant or an analyst to develop a measure of the net benefits of an alternative set of rules, questions such as the following need answers:

1. What is the total amount of labor invested by each farmer in communal irrigation and how is this labor distributed among the farmers?
2. What are the benefits and costs of using the communal irrigation system as opposed to individual irrigation systems?
3. How does the use of the communal irrigation system affect the productivity of each farmer's crops?
4. What are the potential benefits and costs of changing to an alternative irrigation system?
Governing the commons

1. What are the predicted average flows and the predicted values of resource units in the future under a proposed set of rules, as compared with the status quo rules?

2. How variable is the flow of resource units expected to be under a proposed set of rules, as compared with the status quo rules?

3. What quality differences will occur under a proposed set of rules, as compared with the status quo rules?

4. How long is the resource itself likely to generate resource units under a proposed set of rules, as compared with the status quo rules?

5. Will conflict be reduced, stay the same, or increase under a proposed set of rules, as compared with the status quo rules?

The ease or difficulty of answering these questions, as well as the specific answers to be obtained, will depend on a number of situational variables, including (1) the number of appropriators, (2) the size of the resource system, (3) the variability of resource units over time and space, (4) the current condition of the resource system, (5) market conditions, (6) the amount and type of conflict that has existed in the past, (7) the availability of recorded data on current conditions and historical appropriation patterns, (8) the particular status quo rules, and (9) the particular proposed rules (Figure 6.2). The first variable in this list—the number of appropriators—is included in most theories of collective action. The remaining situational variables are rarely considered.

The larger the resource system and/or the number of appropriators, and the more unpredictable the flow of resource units and the market prices for these units, the more difficult and costly it is for anyone to obtain accurate information about the condition of the resource itself and the likely value of the flow of resource units under any set of rules. This can be offset, to some extent, if data on resource conditions, resource-unit quality, prices, and appropriation levels are recorded regularly. Prices and appropriation levels may be recorded for an inshore fishery, for example, if fishers bring all the fish they have caught to a single port to be sold. If fish are purchased by one or a few buyers, records of fish landings may be kept, and the purchaser may have a good picture of the harvesting patterns in these grounds. If the purchaser is motivated to share this information with the fishers, such as when the fishers create a marketing cooperative, the fishers may also gain accurate information about their prior catches and variations in the value of the catch over time. But if the purchaser is a monopolist, who has strategic reasons for withholding information, the purchaser may know much more than the fishers know about overall harvesting patterns.

The establishment of an official monitor (such as the watermaster in the groundwater cases and the local officials in the Swiss and Japanese mountain commons) provides information to appropriators that they would not otherwise obtain, information about appropriation levels and the condition of the resource system itself. The presence of appropriator organizations, such as cooperatives or voluntary associations, usually will increase the amount of information obtained and disseminated among appropriators concerning the variables that will affect whether or not a change in rules will produce a net benefit.

Thus, whether or not an individual perceives any benefits to be derived from a change in rules will depend on (1) the objective conditions of the

A framework for analysis of CPRs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situational variables:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Number of appropriators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Size of CPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Temporal and spatial variability of resource units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Current condition of CPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Market conditions for resource units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Amount and type of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Availability of data about (1) through (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Status quo rules in use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Proposed rules</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.2. Situational variables affecting judgment about the benefits of an institutional choice.
Governing the commons

CPR, (2) the type of information that the current institutional arrangements generate and make available to individuals, and (3) the rules proposed as alternatives. It should now be clear that whether or not benefits can be obtained by changing rules is not a "fact" that simply exists in the world to be used by anyone – appropriators, analysts, or public officials – who wants to improve welfare. Information about benefits must be searched for, organized, and analyzed.

Evaluating costs

Information about costs is also strongly affected by situational variables. Two major costs affect institutional choice. First are the up-front costs of transforming the rules. If the expected costs of transforming the rules are higher than the net benefits to be gained, no further cost calculations will be made. Appropriators will retain their status quo rules that produce fewer benefits than would alternative rules, because the costs of changing the rules are higher than the benefits to be obtained. If the expected costs of transforming the rules are not too high, expected changes in ex post costs will also be evaluated, including the effects of proposed rules on monitoring and enforcement costs. We shall first examine the situational variables that affect information about transformation costs (Figure 6.3).

Transformation costs. Transformation costs are the resources devoted to the process of considering a rule change (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). Many of the variables considered important in current theories of collective action, as listed earlier, affect transformation costs. Transformation costs are, for example, positively related to the number of individuals making institutional choices, the heterogeneity of interests at stake, and the proportion of individuals minimally necessary to achieve a change in status quo rules (set by the rules that govern the process of changing the rules). Transformation costs are lower when skillful leaders are involved. Because transformation costs are up-front costs, they are less likely to be affected by the discount rates used by participants. The sum of transformation costs is not affected by the presence of individuals who have substantial assets at stake, but the likelihood that these costs will be paid is positively related to the presence of individuals who will derive substantial benefits from a change in rules.

Several variables affecting transformation costs are not included in the list cited earlier, however. The type of proposed rule, for example, affects transformation costs. The transformation costs of setting up a strictly private association of appropriators to discuss common problems are con-
Governing the commons

high benefits from the change to pay the entire costs themselves. Consequently, some of the steps in the process of institutional development may not be second-order dilemmas, even though others may have this structure. Further, achieving the benefits of small rule changes will transform the calculus involved in evaluating larger changes.

The norms that individuals share concerning appropriate strategies when engaging in collective choice will affect transformation costs directly and indirectly. When individuals adopt confrontational strategies, for example, transformation costs rise sharply (Scharpf 1989). When some individuals fear that others will attempt to organize minimal winning coalitions to impose costs on losers, that will affect their willingness to adopt changes that would reduce the inclusiveness of the rules to be used in the future. Thus, appropriators who share norms that restrain opportunistic behavior can adopt rules that are less costly to operate than are the rules adopted by appropriators who do not share such norms.

The rules instituted at one time will also affect the transformation costs (or costs of governing) at a later time. Changes in operational rules will affect benefit levels and their distribution to appropriators. Major changes in the level and distribution of benefits can increase or decrease the level of conflict among appropriators and the consequent difficulty that individuals will have in achieving future agreements.8

Whether or not appropriators have substantial autonomy to change their own rules will also affect the costs of transformation. Highly centralized regimes attempt to rely on the same operational rules in all locations within their territory.9 If that is the case, local appropriators must convince a central authority to change the rules in use in all similar settings or convince the authority that an exception can be made in their case. In an honest regime, considerable time must be devoted to any effort to change rules set by central authorities. Time is spent in bureaucratic offices explaining the problem and what is wanted and consulting with others who will be affected by a change, in order to forestall their opposition. Time is spent waiting for an answer. If the request is turned down, time may be spent in appeal processes. In a corrupt regime, bribes may be sufficient to get officials to authorize a rule change or to ignore the fact that local appropriators are using a set of internal rules different from those legally required.10 Also, in a corrupt regime, an influential person may be able to prevent a rule change by bribing an official.

In a regime that allows substantial local autonomy to engage in constitutional and collective choices, appropriators may be authorized to select their own rules so long as they follow certain procedures. The required procedures may vary from informal mechanisms that will ensure consulta-

A framework for analysis of CPRs

tion to formal mechanisms including signed petitions, special elections, legislation, and court proceedings. The aggregation rule to be used frequently is specified in these procedures. The more inclusive the aggregation rule that must be used in making constitutional- or collective-choice decisions, the higher the costs of decision making, and the lower the losses that will be suffered by those protected by status quo rules (Buchanan and Tullock 1962).

Where regular procedures exist for transforming rules, appropriators may be able to estimate transformation costs precisely. If a charter of association is required before setting up private associations or cooperatives, a lawyer can provide a close estimate of the cost of drafting such a charter. If calling a special election to create a district requires 1,000 signatures on a petition, experienced organizers can provide a relatively good estimate of the cost that will be involved in obtaining those signatures.

Where appropriators face officials who have considerable discretion whether or not to allow them to change the rules, estimating transformation costs may be difficult. If such permission has required substantial legal or illegal payments in the past, appropriators may not attempt to change the rules for fear that the costs will be far greater than the benefits to be obtained. One would thus expect less rule innovation and change by appropriators living under political regimes that give regional and national officials considerable discretion whether or not to authorize changes in the rules governing access and use of a CPR, as compared with a jurisdiction in which more autonomy is allowed.

The autonomy of individuals to change their rules will be affected by the location of their CPR and the effectiveness of the political regime under which they live. Autonomy may not be formally extended, but may result primarily because of the distance between a CPR and the nearest administrative or political officials. Appropriate living in remote CPRs usually have more autonomy than those located near governance centers. Whether or not a particular CPR is remote obviously is also affected by the number of officials the political regime employs, the effectiveness of the administrative and political apparatus of the political regime, and the extent of the communication and transportation facilities involved.

The situational variables that affect information about transformation costs are themselves affected by the institutional requirements set by external authorities and the past institutional decisions made by local appropriators. The autonomy of a set of local appropriators to make their own rules is, of course, strongly dependent on what is allowed or forbidden by central authorities, modified by distance and the capacity of the external
Governing the commons

authorities to enforce their rules. The rules that govern the process of changing the rules, the number of decision makers who must be involved, and the resultant heterogeneity of represented interests are affected by the past decisions made by external authorities or local appropriators or both.

Once decisions of a particular type have been made, future options will be strongly affected. To understand institutional-choice processes, one must view them as historical processes whereby current decisions are built on past decisions. Prior decisions may open up some future options for development, and close out others. The groundwater pumpers of Raymond Basin did not necessarily recognize that as soon as they allocated a defined quantity of water to each and every pumper, a market in water rights would emerge, but that is what happened. Similar markets appeared in West Basin and Central Basin. Once a watermaster had been appointed to monitor the usage patterns of all pumpers, the cost of administering a pump tax on withdrawals was substantially less than it would have been if a different type of legal settlement had been adopted. On the other hand, once water rights were assigned on a proportional basis, any future rules that might have protected the rights of municipal water companies above the rights of others using those basins were precluded from further consideration.

Thus, the past exerts its influence on institutional choices in several ways. Current operational rules—the status quo rules—are the results of past decisions. Status quo operational rules always protect some individuals and expose others. A proposed change in these rules must be supported by a set of individuals large enough to have the authority to change them, given status quo collective-choice or constitutional-choice rules for changing the rules. In almost all procedures used in a given collective-choice or constitutional-choice arena, the status quo rules will have a privileged procedural position. Past institutional choices open up some paths and foreclose others to future development.

Monitoring and enforcement costs. When appropriators contemplate changing their rules, part of the calculation has to do with the costs of monitoring and enforcing the new rules. Observing the activities of a diverse set of individuals and assessing whether or not their actions or the outcomes they produce are permitted by a set of rules involves the use of time and other resources that could be devoted to other activities. Monitoring activities frequently are undertaken by the appropriators themselves, either as they go about their normal activities (such as fishers who watch for boats owned by outsiders) or as a special job into which they rotate.

A framework for analysis of CPRs

(such as irrigators, each of whom is responsible for inspecting an irrigation canal for a specified period of time). Maintaining courts, police, and detention facilities involves the use of resources that could be utilized productively for other purposes. Monitoring costs are affected by the physical attributes of the resource itself, the technology available for exclusion and appropriation, marketing arrangements, the proposed rules, and the legitimacy bestowed by external authorities on the results of institutional choices (Figure 6.4). The larger the resource, the greater the costs of “fencing” and/or patrolling the boundaries to ensure that no outsider appropriates. For many natural resources, such as fisheries, fencing is physically impossible. Even maintaining effective markers may be costly. Inshore fisheries, particularly those located in lagoons or bays, involve lower exclusion costs than do offshore
When irrigators using a canal are assigned particular time slots, as in breaker by someone who may be only indirectly harmed by the infraction. - no matter who undertakes it - is proscribed are less costly to monitor than enforce, as compared with rules specifying a quantity of a resource to be appropriator can challenge such unauthorized use without fear that the charge will later be declared unfounded. Rules limiting harvesting technology, such as those used in the Nova Scotian fisheries, are also less costly to enforce, as compared with rules specifying a quantity of a resource to be withdrawn.

Rules that bring together those who would be tempted to cheat and those who would be particularly harmed by such cheating are also easier to monitor than are rules that depend on accidental discovery of a rule-breaker by someone who may be only indirectly harmed by the infraction. When irrigators using a canal are assigned particular time slots, as in

Factors that enhance the capacity of users to see or hear one another as they are engaged in appropriation activities tend to lower monitoring and enforcement costs. Alternatively, if appropriators all return to the same location at the end of their activities, so that the quantity of resource units each has acquired is open for casual inspection, monitoring costs will be low. The presence of a shared norm that rules decided on by the appropriators themselves should be followed will offset many physical disadvantages in monitoring a particular resource. Shared norms related to the legitimacy of the rules and the imperative that they be followed will reduce the costs of monitoring, and their absence will increase those costs. The availability of low-cost facilities for recording and disseminating information about regulated activities will also decrease monitoring costs.

Rules themselves vary in terms of monitoring and enforcement costs. The more frequent the required monitoring, the greater the resources devoted to measurement. Rules that unambiguously state that some action – no matter who undertakes it – is proscribed are less costly to monitor than are rules that require more information about who is pursuing a particular behavior and why.

Rules specifying the opening and closing dates of seasons, such as those used in Swiss and Japanese mountain commons, are far less costly to monitor than are rules that specify a quota for every appropriator in regard to a quantity of appropriation activities (e.g., acre-feet of water pumped, or tons of fish caught). Anyone found appropriating from the resource before or after the official season is unambiguously breaking the rules. Any appropriator can challenge such unauthorized use without fear that the charge will later be declared unfounded. Rules limiting harvesting technology, such as those used in the Nova Scotian fisheries, are also less costly to enforce, as compared with rules specifying a quantity of a resource to be withdrawn.

Rules that bring together those who would be tempted to cheat and those who would be particularly harmed by such cheating are also easier to monitor than are rules that depend on accidental discovery of a rule-breaker by someone who may be only indirectly harmed by the infraction. When irrigators using a canal are assigned particular time slots, as in

In those areas where national governments fail to respect the property rights that local appropriators have developed for themselves (such as Nova Scotia and Newfoundland), exclusion costs can become very high (Cordell and McKean 1986; A. Davis, 1984; Matthews and Phyne 1988). In fact, indigenous institutions that have evolved in remote locations may become untenable at later junctures if those areas become attractive to external users who have the backing of a regional or national government. Some national governments have provided considerable economic support for the development of modern fishing fleets that have then successfully invaded inshore fisheries that previously were "owned" by local fisheries. Without the advantage of being considered legitimate, a small group of local appropriators can face high costs in trying to exclude well-financed, government-supported users who do not have local property rights.

Evaluating shared norms and other opportunities

How individuals weight their own assessments of benefits and costs will depend on the norms that they internalize and the discount rates that they
Governing the commons

utilize. Coleman (1987a) distinguishes between norms that are internalized by individuals, where the sanctioning for nonconformity is an internal cost (e.g., guilt, anxiety, lowered conception of self-worth), and shared norms, where the sanctioning for nonconformity comes from others who are part of the same group and exhibit social displeasure if a norm is broken. Individuals frequently internalize a shared norm, in which case lack of conformity involves both internal psychic and external social costs.

Appropriators who live near the CPR from which they appropriate and who interact with each other in many situations other than the sharing of their CPR are apt to develop strong norms of acceptable behavior and to convey their mutual expectations to one another in many reinforcing encounters (Figure 6.5). The reason for the general hostility of inshore, small-boat fishers toward large-scale trawlers is not simply that the appropriation technology used by the trawlers is so much more powerful than theirs. Often the operators of trawlers live elsewhere, belong to different ethnic or racial groups, and share few of the local norms of behavior. They do not drink in the same bars, their families do not live in the nearby fishing villages, and they are not involved in the network of relationships that depend on the establishment of a reputation for keeping promises and accepting the norms of the local community regarding behavior.

Appropriators who are involved in activities that take them away from their CPR and into an economy in which other opportunities exist are most likely to adopt a high discount rate than are appropriators who presume that they and their children are dependent on the local CPR for major economic returns. It is also the case that shared norms can affect discount rates as much as can information about other opportunities. Individuals

Situational variables:
1. Appropriators live near CPR
2. Appropriators involved in many situations together
3. Information made available to appropriators about opportunities that exist elsewhere

— Figure 6.5. Situational variables affecting internal norms and discount rate.

A framework for analysis of CPRs

living in a community where disregard for the future is censured by others will have a lower discount rate than will individuals living in a community where no opprobrium is attached to seeking short-term gain in preference to long-term benefit.12

The process of institutional change

One can predict that in a highly competitive environment, those who do not search for and select alternative rules that can enhance net benefits will lose out to those who are successful in adopting better rules. It is the operation of firms in competitive, or at least contestable, markets that enables theorists to predict that surviving firms will choose strategies that will maximize profits (Alchian 1950). Theoretical equilibria exist in market models after all of the inefficient or non-profit-maximizing firms have been eliminated. The process of getting to equilibrium is not the focus of these models; rather, they focus on the characteristics of the market and the firms in the market at theoretical equilibrium. That many firms do not maximize profits prior to equilibrium is unimportant when the theoretical question of interest concerns the characteristics of actors who are present at equilibrium. The institutional arrangement of an open market and the theoretical interest in static equilibria enable theorists to posit maximization of a single variable – profits – as an internal decision rule for rational individuals in a market situation. Further, price is a sufficient statistic for summarizing an incredible amount of specific information of value to an entrepreneur. Profit maximization is a useful theoretical tool for predicting behavior in static market situations; it does not enable a theorist to predict which firms are most likely to survive or to predict innovative technological or institutional changes.13

CPR situations are rarely as powerful in driving participants – even survivors – toward efficiency as are competitive markets. Nor is there any single variable, such as market price, that can be used as the foundation for making rational choices in a CPR environment. Simply following short-term profit maximization in response to the market price for a resource unit may, in a CPR environment, be exactly the strategy that will destroy the CPR, leaving everyone worse off. Nonmonetized relationships may be of importance. It is thus not a judicious theoretical strategy to presume that choices about rules are made to maximize some single observable variable. The level of uncertainty when selecting new rules is far greater than the level of uncertainty when selecting pricing strategies when demand and supply are fixed. The intended outcomes of using new rules are not automatically achieved. They depend on many future choices to be made by...
many different individuals as to how they interpret the meaning of the rules and whether or not they will follow the rules, monitor each other, and impose sanctions on nonconformance. Instead of viewing decisions about changes in rules as mechanical calculation processes, a better theoretical stance is to view institutional choices as processes of making informed judgments about uncertain benefits and costs. It is then possible to draw on the empirically supported theoretical work of social psychologists concerning the processes of human judgment in an effort to characterize the institutional-choice process. All human judgment in uncertain and complex environments is subject to several known biases.

Individuals weight, for example, potential losses more heavily than potential gains (Hardin 1982; Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Consequently, individuals will differentially weight the expected benefits of avoiding future harms more heavily than the benefits of producing future goods. From this, one can derive several general predictions about situational variables that are apt to lead individuals to adopt new rules to protect CPR resources. The propensity of political leaders to discuss CPR problems in terms of "crises" is far more understandable once one takes into account that individuals weight perceived harms more heavily than perceived benefits of the same quantity. Further, one should expect that resource systems that can be rapidly destroyed (such as fish populations that cluster together rather than disperse) are far more difficult to govern by appropriators, or anyone else, than are CPRs that are somewhat more resilient following damage.

One should expect individuals to be willing to adopt new rules that will restrict their appropriation activities when there are clear indicators of resource degradation, generally perceived to be accurate predictors of future harm, or when leaders are able to convince others that a "crisis" is impending. Gilles and Jamtgaard (1981), for example, argue from several empirical studies that whether grazing areas are used to produce milk or wool or meat can affect the ability of the appropriators to learn more rapidly about adverse conditions, should they arise. Milking occurs daily, and variations in yield are rapidly apparent to the herders. Wool is sheared less frequently, but the quality of wool is immediately apparent to those who herd sheep. The quality of meat produced for market is monitored less frequently and may not even be known by herders. Consequently, the quality and timeliness of the information that CPR appropriators obtain about their resource vary according to how a resource unit is used, as well as across resource types. The problems of groundwater pumpers in obtaining accurate and valid information about the condition of their CPR are far more daunting than those of herders, regardless of the final products of herding activities.

A framework for analysis of CPRs

As compared with uncertain benefits and costs extending over time, up-front transformation costs are easier to calculate and sometimes are substantial. All appropriators pay more attention to immediate costs than to benefits that will be strung out over the future. Given the tendency of decision makers to weight prospective losses more heavily than possible gains, transformation costs take on added importance in the judgments made by appropriators in regard to changing their rules. It is highly unlikely that CPR appropriators will pay immediate transformation costs to change their rules if the discounted net benefits of a rule change are not expected to be large.

The capacity of individuals to make accurate estimates of frequency-based probabilities is also quite limited. Individuals are apt to weight recent events more heavily than events more distant in a long history of experience. One should expect rule changes to be made after a series of relatively bad yields from a CPR, but not to be made after a series of relatively good years. Proponents of new institutions related to water supply problems pray for dry weather immediately preceding special elections or other decision points affecting institutional choice. When the quantity of resource units varies wildly from season to season, it is particularly difficult for appropriators to obtain accurate estimates of average yields and to make reasoned judgments about the meaning of low yields. It is easy to argue that the resource has had low yields in the past and has recovered, when that has been the shared experience. It is far more costly to keep accurate records over a long period of time and to gain sufficient technical expertise to make accurate predictions about the future.

The particular set of rules that appropriators, or others, contemplate rarely contains all possible rules that might be used to govern an operational situation. The rules that are proposed are likely to be in a repertoire of rules already familiar to those who propose them. Given the substantial uncertainty associated with any change in rules, individuals are less likely to adopt unfamiliar rules than they are to adopt rules used by others in similar circumstances that have been known to work relatively well. In a setting in which considerable experimentation has occurred with diverse rules, appropriators learn about the effects of different rules by analyzing the experiences of appropriators using similar CPRs with different rules.

In southern California, for example, groundwater pumpers in West Basin and Central Basin were able to learn from the experience of those in Raymond Basin before they adopted variants of the rules used in Raymond Basin. Institutional arrangements that encourage communication among
individuals facing similar problems, such as regionwide associations, increase the knowledge base about how different rules work in practice. The wrong lessons can also be learned. Some of the water users in the Mojave Desert presumed that they could apply the strategy of litigation and formation of special districts, as used in Raymond, West, and Central Basins. Instead of applying the lesson by starting with small incremental changes at the basin level before attempting to build interbasin institutions, they went to the interbasin level first, before designing intrabasin institutions. What worked as an incremental bottom-up strategy at the basin level did not work when attempted at a regional level.

So far, I have not addressed the individual differences that may exist among individuals involved in an institutional-choice situation. The benefits to be derived from status quo rules or alternative rules may not be perceived similarly by all appropriators from a given CPR. If a current set of rules protects one subset of appropriators, while leaving others exposed to future harm, the two groups will evaluate the status quo rules differently. Some appropriators may be protected by their physical location (rather than by the rules in use) so as to be less exposed than others. Upstream appropriators (such as the city of Hawthorne in West Basin) may view proposed rule changes to restrict appropriation rates as providing few benefits to them. Because of their physical location, they will derive benefits from access to the CPR long after others have been eliminated. Proposed rules are apt to have strong distributional effects (Libecap 1989).

Predicting institutional change

Clearly, we can reject the notion that appropriators are incapable of supplying their own institutions to solve CPR problems, but we cannot replace it with a presumption that appropriators will adopt new rules whenever the net benefits of a rule change will exceed net costs. Net benefits and costs from a change in the operational rules related to a CPR do not exist in the world as independent variables easily available to CPR appropriators or officials of external regimes to use in a simple maximization calculation. Benefits and costs have to be discovered and weighed by individuals using human judgment in highly uncertain and complex situations that are made even more complex to the extent that others behave strategically.

Designing and adopting new institutions to solve CPR problems are difficult tasks, no matter how homogeneous the group, how well informed the members are about the conditions of their CPR, and how deeply ingrained are the generalized norms of reciprocity. Given the strong temptations to shirk, free-ride, and generally act opportunistically that usually occur when individuals face problems in a remote location under a political regime that is basically indifferent to what happens with regard to CPRs of this type. This is a "zero condition" in regard to the role of an external regime in affecting internal choices. In such a setting, the likelihood of CPR appropriators adopting a series of incremental changes in operational rules to improve joint welfare will be positively related to the following internal characteristics:

1. Most appropriators share a common judgment that they will be harmed if they do not adopt an alternative rule.
2. Most appropriators will be affected in similar ways by the proposed rule changes.
3. Most appropriators highly value the continuation activities from this CPR; in other words, they have low discount rates.
4. Appropriators face relatively low information, transformation, and enforcement costs.
5. Most appropriators share generalized norms of reciprocity and trust that can be used as initial social capital.
6. The group appropriating from the CPR is relatively small and stable.

These variables are weakly ordered, beginning with those that I think are most important in affecting the likelihood of individuals agreeing to new rules that will improve welfare, and ending with those that I think are
somewhat less important. Although considerable emphasis has been placed on the size of the group involved in collective-action problems, I consider the first five variables to be more important than the number of persons involved.\textsuperscript{17}

Most CPRs in the modern world are not found in isolated settings. The closer the CPR is to other centers of economic activity, the more likely it is that the population of the area, the value of the resource unit, and the activities of appropriators in nearby CPRs will change in ways that will adversely affect the outcomes achieved in the subject CPR. In nongovernmental locations, the orientation of the ruling political regime can make a substantial difference in whether local appropriators supply their own institutions or are dependent on external authorities to solve their problems.

Individuals who are not able to supply new rules in an indifferent setting may succeed in adopting new rules under a political regime that allows substantial local autonomy, invests in enforcement agencies, and provides generalized institutional-choice and conflict-resolution arenas. In other words, regional and national governments can play a positive role in providing facilities to enhance the ability of local appropriators to engage in effective institutional design. This positive role is quite different from the one envisioned in proposals to centralize control of natural resources. I illustrated this difference in Chapter 1 with the analysis based on Games 2, 3, and 4, on the one hand, and Game 5, on the other. The difference is also illustrated in the cases by the strategies adopted by the Department of Water Resources in California, as compared with the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans in Newfoundland. I strongly doubt that the population of the area, the value of the resource unit, and the activities of appropriators in nearby CPRs will change in ways that will adversely affect the outcomes achieved in the subject CPR. In nongovernmental locations, the orientation of the ruling political regime can make a substantial difference in whether local appropriators supply their own institutions or are dependent on external authorities to solve their problems.

Having considered the effects that indifferent and facilitative regimes can have on the likelihood that appropriators will adopt new rules that will enhance joint outcomes, let us turn to what can be expected from a regime whose officials presume that they, rather than the appropriators, must solve CPR problems. Let us first posit honest officials, who are seriously interested in helping to solve CPR problems. Once national or regional governmental officials indicate that they consider it their responsibility to solve CPR problems, one can expect local appropriators who do not already have local institutions in place to wait for the government to handle their problems.\textsuperscript{19} If someone else agrees to pay the costs of supplying new institutions, it is difficult to overcome the temptation to free-ride. Then the problem for some appropriators is how to present the "facts" of the local situation in such a way that officials who may not know the local circumstances well will be led to create institutions that will leave some individuals better off than others.\textsuperscript{20} Those individuals who have the resources to enable them to make the best case to external officials are most likely to gain rules (or exceptions to rules) that will advantage them the most. One can expect that honest, hard-working regional or national officials may well supply new CPR institutions well adapted to local circumstances.
in some of the CPRs under their jurisdiction. But the tendency to try to impose uniform rules throughout a jurisdiction, rather than specialized rules that apply to localities within a jurisdiction, makes it extremely difficult for such officials to set up and enforce rules that will seem effective and fair to local appropriators. Trying to get local appropriators to commit themselves to follow rules that are perceived to be ineffective and inequitable is difficult, and the costs of monitoring and enforcing such rules are bound to be higher than for rules crafted by participants to fit local circumstances.

If, instead of honest officials, one posits corrupt centralized regimes, the problems involved in institutional supply become more difficult. It may be possible for local appropriators to create their own local institutions outside the legal framework. One would expect, however, that any set of local appropriators capable of accomplishing that difficult task would be very homogeneous, would have good information about their CPR and about the behaviors of their peers, would have very low discount rates, and generally would exhibit all of the desirable characteristics listed earlier in the extreme. A more probable result would be that experienced by the settlers in the Kirindi Oya irrigation system in Sri Lanka, where no one cooperated with anyone else, and all lived in a hydrologic nightmare.

**A CHALLENGE TO SCHOLARSHIP IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES**

This framework for analyzing problems of institutional choice illustrates the complex configurations of variables that must be addressed when individuals in field settings attempt to fashion rules to improve their individual and joint outcomes. The reason for presenting this complex array of variables as a framework rather than as a model is precisely because one cannot encompass (at least with current methods) this degree of complexity within a single model. When one chooses to model relationships, one can include only a subset of variables, and even then it is usually necessary to set some of these equal to zero or to an absolute value. The typical assumptions of complete information, independent action, perfect symmetry of interests, no human error, no norms of reciprocity, zero monitoring and enforcement costs, and no capacity to transform the situation itself will lead to highly particularized models, not universal models. It is impossible, therefore, to map the terrain for a family of models as it is to develop specific models.

The complex configurations of variables that must be addressed when individuals in field settings attempt to fashion rules to improve their individual and joint outcomes. The reason for presenting this complex array of variables as a framework rather than as a model is precisely because one cannot encompass (at least with current methods) this degree of complexity within a single model. When one chooses to model relationships, one can include only a subset of variables, and even then it is usually necessary to set some of these equal to zero or to an absolute value. The typical assumptions of complete information, independent action, perfect symmetry of interests, no human error, no norms of reciprocity, zero monitoring and enforcement costs, and no capacity to transform the situation itself will lead to highly particularized models, not universal models. It is impossible, therefore, to map the terrain for a family of models as it is to develop specific models. If the social sciences are to be relevant for analyses of policy problems, the challenge will be to integrate efforts to map the broad terrain and efforts to develop tractable models for particular niches in that terrain. Each CPR can be viewed as a niche in an empirical terrain.

The intellectual trap in relying entirely on models to provide the foundation for policy analysis is that scholars then presume that they are omniscient observers able to comprehend the essentials of how complex, dynamic systems work by creating stylized descriptions of some aspects of those systems. With the false confidence of presumed omniscience, scholars feel perfectly comfortable in addressing proposals to governments that are conceived in their models as omnicompetent powers able to rectify the imperfections that exist in all field settings.

In contemporary conceptions of social order, "the government" often is seen as an external agent whose behavior is exogenous to the situation being modeled. Sugden argues that policy analysts taking this view see themselves as analyzing the behaviors of private individuals and then advising "the" government as to what should be done:

Most modern economic theory describes a world presided over by a government (not, significantly, by governments), and sees this world through the government's eyes. The government is supposed to have the responsibility, the will and the power to restreucture society in whatever way maximizes social welfare; like the US Cavalry in a good Western, the government stands ready to rush to the rescue whenever the market "fails", and the economist's job is to advise it on when and how to do so. Private individuals, in contrast, are credited with little or no ability to solve collective problems among themselves. This makes for a distorted view of some important economic and political issues. (Sugden 1986, p. 3)

Illustrative of this distorted view, and of direct relevance to the analysis of institutional change in CPR settings, is a study by Rolph (1982, 1983) concerning efforts to regulate CPRs, including the set of southern California groundwater basins examined in Chapter 4. Having described the general problem of overuse in relation to such resources, Rolph indicates that "the government (any of the three branches) is called upon to allocate user rights as a means of limiting a production or a consumption activity" (Rolph 1983, p. 51). In regard to the groundwater users, she writes that "they turned to the government for a program that would limit use equitably among the existing users" (Rolph 1983, p. 51). She was puzzled by what appeared to her to be a contradiction in that users were allowed to acquire private property rights to what was a public or a communal resource. She argues that "if the government had foreseen a future shortage of the resource, it might have laid claim to it in the beginning, before any users had made investments" (Rolph 1983, p. 51). As she puzzles about options, she asks this:
Governing the commons

As the government steps in to limit use, should it simply allocate complete property rights to a small sub-group of the users while stripping the rest of their limited communal rights? Alternatively, should it take the resource from its present users and redistribute it? Or should it first take away and then sell back the resource to its present users? (Rolph 1983, pp. 51–2)

What I find remarkable about Rolph's observations in regard to the groundwater cases is that the only policy actor she sees as being relevant is the amorphous, fictitious, and omnicompetent entity called "the government." The users are viewed as turning to "the government for a program," rather than themselves struggling to find workable and equitable solutions to difficult problems within arenas provided by courts, by legislative bodies, and by local authorities.

The models that social scientists tend to use for analyzing CPR problems have the perverse effect of supporting increased centralization of political authority. First, the individuals using CPRs are viewed as if they are capable of short-term maximization, but not of long-term reflection about joint strategies to improve joint outcomes. Second, these individuals are viewed as if they are in a trap and cannot get out without some external authority imposing a solution. Third, the institutions that individuals may have established are ignored or rejected as inefficient, without examining how these institutions may help them acquire information, reduce monitoring and enforcement costs, and equitably allocate appropriation rights and provision duties. Fourth, the solutions presented for "the" government to impose are themselves based on models of idealized markets or idealized states.

We in the social sciences face as great a challenge in how to address the analysis of CPR problems as do the communities of people who struggle with ways to avoid CPR problems in their day-to-day lives. The theoretical enterprise requires social scientists to engage in model-building, but not theoretical inquiry to that specific level of discourse. We need to appreciate the analytical power that can be derived from the prior intellectual efforts of important contributors such as Hobbes, Montesquieu, Hume, Smith, Madison, Hamilton, Tocqueville, and many others. Contemporary studies in the theory of public and social choice, the economics of transactions costs, the new institutional economics, law and economics, game theory, and many related fields are making important contributions that need to be carried forward in theoretically informed empirical inquiries in both laboratory and field settings.

Notes

1. REFLECTIONS ON THE COMMONS

1 Attributed to Merrill M. Flood and Melvin Dresher and formalized by Albert W. Tucker (R. Campbell 1985, p. 3), the game is described (Luce and Raiffa 1957, p. 93) as follows: "Two suspects are taken into custody and separated. The district attorney is certain that they are guilty of a specific crime, but he does not have adequate evidence to convict them at a trial. He points out to each prisoner that each has two alternatives: to confess to the crime the police are sure they have done, or not to confess. If they both do not confess, then the district attorney states he will book them on some very minor trumped-up charge such as petty larceny and illegal possession of a weapon, and they will both receive minor punishment; if they both confess they will be prosecuted, but he will recommend less than the most severe sentence; but if one confesses and the other does not, then the confessor will receive lenient treatment for turning state's evidence whereas the latter will get 'the book' slapped at him. In terms of years in a penitentiary, the strategic problem might be reduced" to the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prisoner 1</th>
<th>Not confess</th>
<th>Confess</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not confess</td>
<td>1 year each</td>
<td>10 years for prisoner 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confess</td>
<td>3 months for prisoner 1</td>
<td>8 years each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 years for prisoner 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R. Kenneth Godwin and W. Bruce Shepard (1979), Richard Kimber (1981), Michael Taylor (1987), and others have shown that commons dilemmas are not always prisoner's dilemma (PD) games. Dawes (1973, 1975) was one of the first scholars to show the similarity of structure.

2. Hardin's model easily translates into the prisoner's dilemma structure. Many problems related to the use of common-pool resources (CPRs) do not easily
translating. Simple games such as “chicken” and “assurance” games are better representations of some situations (M. Taylor 1987). More complex games involving several moves and lacking dominant strategies for the players are better able to capture many of the problems involved in managing CPRs.

3 Harding recommends “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon” as a solution to the problem, but what “mutual agreement” means is ambiguous given his emphasis on the role of central regulators; see Orr and Hill (1979) for a critique.

4 A howling debate raged for some time, for example, regarding whether the number of participants involved was positively, negatively, or not at all related to the quantity of the good provided (Buchanan 1968; Chamberlin 1974; Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1970; McGuire 1974). Russell Hardin (1982) resolved the controversy to a large extent by pointing out that the effect of the number of contributors was largely dependent on the type of collective benefits being provided – whether or not each unit of the good was subtractable. Thus, the initial debate did not lead to clarification until implicit assumptions about the type of good involved had been made explicit.

5 J. A. Moore (1985, p. 483), reporting on the education project for the American Society of Zoologists.


7 Michael Taylor (1987) analyzes the structure of Hobbes’s theory to show that Hobbes proposed the creation of a Leviathan in order to avoid the equilibrium of situations structured like prisoner’s dilemmas. See also Sugden (1986).

8 Stillman (1975, p. 13) points out that those who see “a strong central government or a strong ruler” as a solution implicitly assume that “the ruler will be a wise and ecologically aware altruist,” even though these same theorists presume that the users of CPRs will be myopic, self-interested, and ecologically unaware hedonists.

9 The form of regulation used in Game 2 would be referred to in the resource economics literature as a “pure quota scheme.” Alternative regulatory instruments that are frequently proposed are a “pure licensing scheme” and a “pure tax scheme.” As Dasgupta and Heal (1979) point out, however, it is “the government in each of these schemes that takes control of the resource and sets up the regulatory scheme.” The “idea, in each case, is for the government to take charge of the common property resource and to introduce regulations aimed at the attainment of allocative efficiency” (Dasgupta and Heal 1979, p. 66). All of the models of these various schemes assume that the costs of sustaining these systems are nil (as in Game 2). Dasgupta and Heal repeatedly stress that these costs are not nil in field settings and may affect whether or not any of them actually will solve a commons problem or serve. In addition to the “all cooperate at every iteration” equilibrium, many other equilibria are also possible. Simple repetition without enforceable agreements does not produce a clear result (Güth, Leininger, and Stephan 1990).

10 More accurately, the sum of the two types of errors must be less than 0.50, given the fixed parameters of this game, for the restructured game to have a (C, C) equilibrium. I am grateful to Franz Weissing, who suggested this particular analysis for illustrating the problem of incomplete information on the part of a central agency.

11 This overlooks the fact that in a dynamic setting the decision whether to manage the meadow at a sustainable level or to “mine” it rapidly will depend delicately on the discount rate used by the private owner. If the discount rate is high, the private owner will “overuse” a commons just as much as will a series of unorganized co-owners. See Clark (1977) for a clear statement of how overexploitation can occur under private property.

12 And it should be pointed out that the private-rights system itself is a public institution and is dependent on public instrumentalities for its very existence (Binger and Hoffman 1989).

13 My thanks again to Franz Weissing, who suggested this symmetric version of the contract-enforcement game. I had originally modeled Game 5 giving one herder the right to offer a contract, and the second herder only the right to agree or not agree to it.

14 See the interesting paper by Okada and Kleint (1990), in which they model a three-player contract-enforcement game using the rule that any two (or three) persons who agree can set up their own contract to be enforced by an external agent. They conclude that three persons will not make use of a costless enforcement process, whereas two may. The article helps to illustrate how very subtle changes in conditions can make important differences in results.

15 Williamson (1983) argues, however, that the numbers of actual unresolved PD situations in long-term business relationships have been exaggerated because economists have overlooked the contracts that businesses negotiate to change the structure of incentives related to long-term contracts.

16 Much of the literature in the new institutional economics tradition has stressed the importance of private orderings in the governance of long-term private contracts (Galanter 1981; Williamson 1979, 1985).

17 When considerable competition exists among arbitrators for the job of monitoring and enforcing, one can assume that arbitrators are strongly motivated to make fair decisions. If there is no competition, then one faces the same problem in presuming fair decisions as one does in relation to a public bureau with monopoly status.

18 Simply iterating the PD game is not a guaranteed way out of the dilemma. The famous “folk theorem” that cooperation is a possible perfect equilibrium outcome is sometimes misrepresented as asserting that cooperation is the only equilibrium in repeated games. In addition to the “all cooperate at every iteration” equilibrium, many other equilibria are also possible. Simple repetition without enforceable agreements does not produce a clear result (Güth, Leininger, and Stephan 1990).

19 Private orderings frequently are mistaken for no order, given the absence of an official formal legislative or court decision. See Galanter (1981) for a review of the extensive literature on private orderings.
The formal game-theoretical structures and outcomes of this and three other sets of rules for allocating fishing sites are analyzed by Gardner and E. Ostrom (1990).

See, for example, the cases contained in National Research Council (1986), McCay and Acheson (1987), Fortmann and Bruce (1988), Berkes (1989), Pinkerton (1989a), Ruddle and Akimichi (1984), Coward (1980), and Uphoff (1986c). In addition to these collections, see citations in F. Martin (1989) for the extensive literature contained in books, monographs, articles, and research reports. There are also common-property institutions that break down when challenged by very rapid population growth or changes in the market value of the products harvested from the CPR. As discussed in Chapter 5, however, fragility of common-property systems is much more likely when these systems are not recognized by the formal political regimes of which they are a part.

Let me state at this point that the term "appropriator" is used in some legal systems to denote a person who has a particular legal claim to water resources (Schlager 1989). See Berkes (1989) for a description of the strategies temporarily adopted by the Cree Indians near Hudson’s Bay when an influx of nonnative trappers threatened the beaver stock. Legislation passed in 1930 legally recognized American-Indian communal and family territories, allowing the Cree to anticipate long-term survival for a key CPR. Since 1930, the Cree have successfully managed the beaver stock using the rules that had been tested by centuries of trial and error prior to the arrival of Europeans on the North American continent.


Sequential, contingent, and frequency-dependent behaviors may, of course, occur in unorganized settings. Some very interesting game-theoretical results have relied on the tendencies of individuals to rely on such forms of coordinated activities alone, without changing the underlying structures (Kreps et al. 1982; Levhari and Mirman 1980; Schelling 1978). An important aspect of organizing a legislative process, for example, is the set of rules that specify the steps through which a bill must be processed before it becomes a law. Changing the positive and negative inducements is the type of intervention that has received the most attention in the social sciences.

Alchian and Demsetz (1972) overemphasize the importance of collective action in a market institution, is that of an interdependent production function. When the production function is interdependent, the marginal contribution of any one owner of an input factor will depend on the level of other inputs. One cannot tell from an examination of outputs alone how much any individual contributed. Rewarding inputs requires high levels of monitoring that are not needed when factors are combined additively. Williamson (1975), drawing inspiration from Coase (1937), argues that this is only one source of the need for organized firms. Williamson then relies more on the costs of transacting in a market in which all act independently, as contrasted with a firm in which individuals agree ex ante to coordinate their activities ex post.

This stylized version does not do full justice to the extensive work on the theory of the firm, and I certainly do not recommend any policy prescriptions.
on the basis of this sketch. Because my purpose is only to show how the theory solves the collective-action problem, I am presenting only this barebones outline. Readers who wish to see the work of Coase (1937), Alchian and Demsetz (1972), and Williamson (1975, 1985).

This discussion of the theory of the state draws most heavily on the work of scholars who base their theory of the state on Hobbes; it does not reflect the full range of debate about the theory of the state (Breton 1974; Levi 1988a; Niskanen 1971; M. Taylor 1987). My purpose in discussing the theory of the firm and the theory of the state is not to explore those theories but to point up the absence of an accepted theory for how individuals self-organize without an "external" leader who obtains most of the benefits. As Vincent Ostrom has so well demonstrated (1986a, 1987, 1989), when the "theory of the state" is used as the theory underlying a concept of democratic self-governance, basic contradictions exist. As long as a single center has a monopoly on the use of coercion, one has a state rather than a self-governed society.

Both are also subject to limits imposed by span-of-control problems: The cost of monitoring increases with the size and diversity of a firm or a society. See, for example, the studies by Schelling (1960), Elster (1979), Brennan and Buchanan (1985), Levi (1988a,b), Shepsle (1989a), North and Weingast (1989), and Williamson (1985).

Reading a working paper by Shepsle (1989a) made me recognize how important this problem is to understanding CPR problems, as well as many other problems of interest to an institutional analyst.

This is how the literature on the "economics of crime" models the decision to comply or not (Becker 1968; Ehrlich 1973; Ehrlich and Brower 1987); for an insightful critique, see Tsebelis (1989).

"Common knowledge" is an important assumption frequently used in game theory and essential for most analyses of equilibrium. It implies that all participants know x, that the participants know that each of the others knows x, and that the participants know that each of the others know that each of the others knows x (Aumann 1976).


These levels exist whether the organized human activity is public or private. See Boudreaux and Holcombe (1989) for a discussion of the constitutional rules of homeowner associations, condominiums, and some types of housing developments.

See, for example, Alexander Field's critiques of the work of institutional theorists who have attempted to develop rational-choice theories of institutional choice (Field 1979, 1984).

In designing the construction of an irrigation community, for example, setting up a legislative body requires determining how many representatives there should be. Determining the number of representatives will be affected by the physical layout. If there are 5 canals, having one representative from each canal may not work well. If there are 70 canals, the participants may want to cluster canals into branches in order to select representatives. Whatever constitutional choice is made about how many (and how to select) representatives, the effects on appropriation and closed-access CPR appropriation practices will come about as a result of decisions made at both a collective-choice level and an operational level. It is extremely difficult to predict these with any exactitude prior to experience in a particular setting.

3. ANALYZING LONG-ENDURING, SELF-ORGANIZED, AND SELF-GOVERNED CPRs

A substantial debate has been engendered among institutional economists and economic historians over the issue of whether or not long-enduring institutions are optimally efficient. The way the question is addressed in many instances leads to an automatic yes or no answer, depending on what variables are considered as constraints on the problem. If information and transactions
costs are not considered, no real-world institution can ever be optimally efficient. If all information and transactions costs are included as fixed constraints, all long-enduring institutions are automatically optimally efficient. Neither position is very useful in evaluating institutions. I prefer to argue that optimality is not well defined in a changing environment, including the capacity to change the institutional rules themselves. One must use criteria other than optimal efficiency to evaluate long-enduring institutions (Ringer and Hoffman 1989; Furubotn and Richter 1989; Harris 1989; North 1989).

2 As Demsetz (1967, p. 354) stated his concerns about negotiation costs, "it is conceivable that those who own these rights, i.e., every member of the community, can agree to curtail the rate at which they work the lands if negotiating and policing costs are zero. Each can agree to abridge his rights. It is obvious that the costs of reaching such an agreement will not be zero. What is not obvious is just how large these costs may be. Negotiating costs will be large because it is difficult for many persons to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement, especially when each hold-out has the right to work the land as fast as he pleases. But, even if an agreement among all can be reached, we must yet take account of the costs of policing the agreement, and these may be large also."

3 I had hoped to include an analysis of the persistence of "common lands" in feudal and medieval England. The famous "enclosure acts" of British history have been presented in many history books as the rational elimination of an obviously inefficient institution that had been retained because of an unthinking attachment to the past for an overly long time. Recent economic historians, however, have provided an entirely different picture of English land-tenure systems before the enclosure acts and even of the process of gaining enclosure itself (Dahlman 1980; Fanøelte 1988; McCloskey 1976; Thirk 1959, 1967).

Many of the manorial institutions share broad similarity with the long-enduring institutions described in this chapter: a clear-cut definition of who is authorized to use common resources; efficient rules that can be made; low-cost enforcement mechanisms; local rule-making arenas to change institutions over time in response to environment and economic changes. Common-field property institutions were transported to New England, where they flourished for close to 100 years, until exclusion costs became low enough and/or transactions costs rose to produce a slow evolution from larger to smaller commons, eventually in private tenure (B. Field 1985a,b). Even the presumed increased efficiency of enclosure has come into question.

R. C. Allen (1982) concludes, for example, that the eighteenth-century enclosures of open fields redistributed the existing agricultural income, rather than expanding total income through enhanced efficiency (Yeagly 1977).

4 In personal correspondence, Netting clarifies that citizens in Törbel were "rigidly restricted to descendents in the male line, and the children of women who married outside men were excluded, even though these women’s offspring could inherit private property." Netting reflects that Törbel is a case of a "closed corporate community" in the sense developed by Wolf (1986), because "citizenship closes access to communal resources both to members of neighboring communities who might be direct competitors and to national or colonial states attempting to wrest control from local inhabitants."

5 Restrictions on the use of common grazing lands based on the "home feed base" of the user were common throughout most of feudal Europe. The Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management in the United States currently allocate grazing permits based on the home feed base of the applicant and the carrying capacity of the grazing area (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 1975).

6 Stevenson (1990) examines milk yields for 243 grazing areas in Switzerland and finds that milk yields from common property fall below the yields for private-property alps, but he does not include production or transactions costs in his analyses, and thus no conclusions can be reached concerning efficiency. He finds that grazing pressure on the Swiss commons is lower than on private land.

7 The communally organized forests in Törbel appear to have been well managed through the years, as were the meadows, but some Swiss villages were not able to manage their forests as well as they managed their meadows. Some of the commonly owned forests were divided among villagers to become individually owned woodlots. The lots generally were too small for effective management, and they degenerated until intervention occurred in the nineteenth century (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 1975). Price (1987) provides an overview of the development of legislation in Valais, Graubünden, and Bern.

8 Villages that are no longer dependent on their commons for essential forest products complementary to agricultural productions frequently have leased the land and used that income to finance other village projects. See Sharma (1984), as well as McKeen’s work, for a discussion of the uses of leases.

9 Hayami (1975) comments on the substantial asset that village organization in Japan has been for modern development, in contrast to many Asian countries. The same point is stressed by Sharma (1984), who describes the extensive participation of villagers from all walks of life in village governance and the consequent organizational skills that exist at the village level.

10 Many Muslims remained for a long time in the territories recaptured by the Spanish crown. As individual Muslim families departed, their land and homesteads were granted to Spanish families. Considerable effort was expended to determine how the irrigation systems worked and to maintain the water-distribution procedures as they had operated prior to the reconquest. In 1244, for example, Don Peregrin, one of the knights of James I, ordered several Muslims who had been irrigation officials before the reconquest to appear and "take an oath on pain of their persons and goods" to "tell the truth about the waters, in what way they used to apportion them in the time of the Moors" (Glick 1970, p. 233).

11 Limited parcels of land in the eastern part of Spain have acquired irrigation rights since the reconquest as new irrigation projects have expanded the supply of water.

12 The medieval term for this same position was cequier.

13 See Glick (1970, pp. 64–8) and the references he cites for a discussion of the history of the tribunal and the dispute over its origins.

14 The syndics is the agent of the hereters and is removable by them. In medieval times, the syndics of Valencia were selected for a limited and nonrenewable term by election, lottery, or competitive bidding. The Tormos Canal, for example, used a competitive bidding system. At a public meeting of the hereters, the person who submitted the lowest price to administer the canal was assigned responsibility to administer the canal for three years at the price set in...
his bid. Each bidder had to estimate how large a staff he would need to employ in order to monitor the use of the canals by the irrigators and allocate water in times of drought without conflict erupting. He also needed to estimate the cost of cleaning the central canals once a year and monitoring the work of the herreritos in cleaning the canal frontage that bordered their lands. The total bid of the lowest bidder was divided into pro rata sums assigned to the herreritos according to the amounts of regadós land owned, and thus proportional to the amounts of water obtained (Glick 1970, p. 38). Where a syndic was elected, he also had to determine an annual budget and submit it to the herreritos for approval prior to their obligation to pay a pro rata assignment of the costs of managing the canal. In modern times, the syndics are elected for a two-year term and can succeed themselves. The assessment rate is now determined annually by an executive committee chaired by the syndic.

These rules are both complex and very specific. Maass and Anderson (1986, p. 27) provide a summary of the procedures used on the Benninger Canal. "The first laterals that draw from this canal are two small ones, with rights to continuous water, serving approximately 13 ha each. Shortly thereafter the water encounters its first lengua by which it is divided into two continuous streams in two laterals. The right lateral receives one-third of the water and is called Tert, meaning one-third in Valencian. The left lateral, or structure, Terq then supplies two regions. Water is run in a lateral to Alacucús on Wednesdays and Thursdays and in one to Picaña on the remaining days of the week."

"The two-thirds of the water that flows into the left lateral of the first divisor is separated subsequently into two equal streams by a lengua called the White Cross. Immediately the left one of these streams is further divided into two equal parts, and each of these then supplies smaller laterals and farms: one after the other. The right lateral at the White Cross supplies four channels that run water in succession, one day each."

"This system is interrupted every Thursday for sixteen hours when all the water available at the White Cross is diverted to a single lateral called Thursday (Dijous in Valencian) that serves 12 ha and irrigates at these hours only. For two weeks in a row the sixteen hours are those after sunrise on Thursday, for the third week they are the hours before sunrise on Friday, an arrangement designed to distribute the burden of irrigating at night. For the remaining eight hours on Thursdays the water is divided normally at the White Cross, but that flowing into the right lateral is given each week in succession to one of the four channels served by that lateral in order to preserve the proportions and the timing used normally in that service area."

Glick indicates that the "picture of daily irrigation problems and the methods used to deal with them" represented by the fine books of Castellón "should be applicable to the Valencian huerta as well" (1970, p. 54).

For a researcher who has ridden with police officers in high-crime districts of metropolitan areas, this is an amazing level of activity.

The somewhat higher percentage (58 as contrasted to 42) of infractions due to error or negligence, instead of overt illegal attempts to obtain water, represents a slightly higher recorded infraction rate. Glick's reflection on this infraction rate is as follows: "Again, this is indicative of the way in which the fine structure fine-tunes the system. In Castellón the
funded the extension of a canal by 25 km so that this water could be delivered to Alicante. This water is sold in a daily auction, but the minimum and maximum prices are predetermined under a provision of the initial concession by the national government allowing the firm to export Segura River water. Relationships among Alicante irrigators and both of these private firms have been conflict-ridden and tense at many junctures in their history.

25 Wirtfogel (1957), in his brief discussion of Spanish irrigation institutions after the reconquest, does not distinguish between the “Spanish absolutism” of Castile and the more democratic institutions of eastern Spain. For some time it has been the accepted wisdom that the well-organized shepherders guild (the Mesta) was responsible both for increasing the power of the Castilian monarch and for retarding development in Castile by delaying the development of well-specified property rights in land (Klein 1920). However, recent work by Nugent and Sanchez (1980), using an approach that is quite consistent with the one adopted herein, raises some substantial questions about that conventional view.

26 For an interesting account of the path of evolutionary change in North America, as contrasted with South America, see North (1986a).

27 Until 1923, when the first government-financed irrigation project was constructed, the communal irrigation system was the only form of irrigation management in the Philippines. In 1982 there were approximately 5,700 community irrigation systems in the Philippines, serving approximately 45% of the irrigated area (World Bank 1982, p. 8). For an interesting account of the early efforts to stimulate irrigation-service associations in the Philippines, see Bromley, Taylor, and Parker (1980).

28 Additional atas may be issued if a new irrigation canal is added to an old system by new members, who can acquire shares by constructing the new works and then bearing their share of maintenance for the entire system.

29 The position of a cook seems strange, but at each of the major work seasons of the zanjera, all those working are fed by the cooperative, which is one of the positive inducements used to encourage participation in the extremely difficult labor required by these systems. The cook is very important in this system!

30 I seriously doubt that the farmers would be willing to contribute this high a tax rate in monetized form, even if they were operating in a fully monetized economy. When a farmer contributes labor, he knows how the tax is being allocated, whether or not it is being used for the purpose for which it was levied. When a farmer contributes money, he may fear that it will be diverted to the pockets of bureaucrats or put to other uses beyond the purpose for which it was contributed.

31 Siy points out that this figure underestimates the actual amount of labor supplied to construction and maintenance, because the families of zanjera members and members of neighboring zanjeras, who receive the drainage waters of this system, also contribute labor for major projects. Siy estimates that at least 1,000 additional person-days are contributed by those who do not have direct obligations (Siy 1982, p. 95).

32 Siy refers to the labor contributed to the maintenance of the system as a “voluntary” contribution. Given that there is a high probability that non-participation will be sanctioned by members of the zanjera and/or the federation, calling this a voluntary contribution is misleading. What is voluntary is joining or not joining the zanjera. Those who do not want to abide by the rules can obtain a good price for their land and thus exit. The price of this voluntary decision to join or remain a member, however, is to forgo discretion whether or not to contribute a certain amount of labor each year.

33 Although the level of participation described by Siy is very high, it is not unique in Third World settings. Pradhan (1984) describes an equally sophisticated irrigation system – the Chattis Mauja system – constructed 130 years ago in Nepal, covering 7,300 acres of land irrigated by farmers living in 54 different villages. Also a federal structure, it is organized at village, district, and central levels, in addition to working informally with three other farmer-managed systems. The Chattis Mauja system has a strong record for mobilizing labor input – over 60,520 man-days during 1961 – from at least 3,000 farmers working to desilt the main canal and other arduous tasks.

34 It appears, however, that those who own less than a full atar share have a somewhat higher absentee rate, particularly those who own less than a fourth of a share, but this is not true in regard to the contributions of materials by members owning less than a full share (Siy 1982, p. 99).

35 Computed from Siy (1982, p. 144, Table 38).

36 I do not think it is possible to elucidate necessary and sufficient principles for enduring institutions, as it takes a fundamental willingness of the individuals involved to make any institution work. No set of logical conditions is sufficient to ensure that all sets of individuals will be willing and able to make an institution characterized by such conditions work.

37 It is sometimes argued that the rules defining common property need not be as completely specified and detailed as those defining private property. Runge (1986, pp. 13–4) argues, for example, that “common property – the individual right to joint use – is the norm, comparatively fewer claims must be assigned and defined. Less clarity in the assignment of rights (at least by Western standards) may also result. However, this is balanced against reduced social costs of assignment and definition.” This is true if one means that the physical boundaries for individual use do not have to be mapped, but only the boundaries of the resource. It is certainly not true in regard to the detailed rules that are necessary for governing how the common owners are to appropriate from and provide for the resource.

38 On the other hand, external authorities did not meddle (with the exception of Alicante) was very important. An appropriator who was unhappy about the way rules were enforced in one of these systems was not able to go to a politician at a higher level and get a reversal in return for political support. Thus, external authorities did not angauge the structure that local appropriators had put together. This stands in contrast to several of the cases discussed in Chapter 5.

39 A high level of quasi-voluntary compliance is present in other long-serving collective institutional arrangements. The Chisasibi Cree, for example, have devised a complex set of entry and authority rules related to the fish stocks of James Bay, as well as the beaver stock located in their designated hunting territory. Fikret Berkes (1987, p. 87) describes why these resource systems and the rules used to regulate them have survived and prospered for so long: “effective social mechanisms ensure adherence to rules which exist by virtue of mutual consent within the community. People who violate these rules suffer not only
Notes to pp. 96–113

1 See William Blomquist’s reports (1987a,b, 1988a–c, 1989, 1990) for more detailed analyses of the origins of the institutions for governance and management of the three basins described here, plus analyses of other several basins that have devised different institutional arrangements to achieve self-governing systems.

2 The actual costs of imported water far exceed the wholesale price charged by the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD) for imported water, because considerable portions of the capital costs of constructing the aqueducts bringing water from the Colorado River and from northern California have been paid from property taxes and are not reflected in the wholesale prices charged by MWD.

3 The stock of water in a groundwater basin also is of value independent of its future use as a subtractable quantity of water. The stock of water held in a basin holds “the water being pumped closer to the land surface, which reduces pumping costs” (Nunn 1985, p. 872). These cost savings are collective benefits available to all pumpers.

4 See Louis Weschler (1968) and William Blomquist (1988d) for discussions of the settlement in Orange County, where procurers overtly rejected the idea of a legal settlement bringing water from the Colorado River and from northern California have been paid from property taxes and are not reflected in the wholesale prices charged by MWD.

5 The information presented in this section is based on the work of Blomquist (1988a).

6 The city of Pasadena was the logical initiator of litigation. The city owned overlying land and used water on that land, in addition to being a senior appropriator from the basin.

7 A proportionate cutback is an example of a solution that conforms to Reinhard Selten’s general equity principle (Selten 1978b), whereby some individuals (n)

8 It is interesting to note that the procedure used in the Raymond Basin case, and subsequently in West Basin, Central Basin, and San Gabriel Basin, leads to a “solution” to this problem that is close to but not the same as that recommended by Nash (1950): point C. Mutual prescription has not been uniformly adopted as “the” solution concept used in all southern California groundwater litigations. In the San Fernando Valley, for example, the city of Los Angeles had been granted and has tentatively defended a preemption right to water. The California Supreme Court overturned an initial effort by the trial court to impose a mutual-prescription solution on all parties. The California Supreme Court found, in essence, that the mutual-prescription solution was an equitable solution, but it was not the only equitable solution that could be used in these types of situations (City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, Superior Court Case No. 650073, 1968) (Blomquist 1988e). Water producers in Chino Basin also negotiated a settlement that allocated water rights that was broadly similar to the mutual-prescriptionsolution, but took into account a variety of specific problems that would have arisen if that formula had been applied in a mechanical fashion (Lipson 1978). I appreciate the opportunity to have discussed the logic of this outcome with Roy Gardner.

9 The judge in such a case is in a delicate position. The proposed solution was truly radical and was not based on any of the existing water-rights doctrines. If he accepted a negotiated settlement that he could not justify in his finding he would be overruled by a higher court. On the other hand, there was no clear-cut alternative on which to base his decision. He was in as uncertain a situation as were the litigants.

10 City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra et al., Superior Court Case C-1323.


12 The case was appealed, and a costly and time-consuming appeal procedure could not be avoided.

13 Thus, an N of 19 producers could function as an effective coalition to control most of the production from the basin; see Schelling (1978) on the concept of minimal effective group.

14 One-half of the $25,000 allocated for that purpose came from federal funds, one-fourth was paid for by the county, and the remaining one-fourth was allocated on a pro rata basis to the nine signatory communities.

15 Although there is insufficient space in this chapter to discuss the structure and operational characteristics of the West Basin Water Association, the importance of its activities can hardly be overemphasized. The formal voting rules of the association prevented any potential subgroup from dominating the decisions made within the association. Given the voluntary status of the association, no actions were taken by the association until a consensus was reached. Because actions were being pursued in many different arenas at the same time, major water producers could coordinate activities and monitor the perfor-
The success of the committee was that T. B. Cosgrove was its leader. In 1945 the Dominguez Water Corporation withdrew over 10,000 acre-feet from the basin, or about 15% of the total withdrawals. The reason for the change in position was well documented, because once city officials recognized how exposed they were, they also had to recommend to the citizens of Inglewood that the city join the West Basin Water District to obtain MWD imported water. The mayor had vigorously opposed such a move only three years before. The mayor was repeatedly asked for a clarification for his change of heart. The following statement was printed in the September 26, 1950, Inglewood Daily News: "I have been asked many times the reason why I now support Metropolitan Water District, in view of my previous opposition to it in 1947. This is a very reasonable question and I feel that it is my obligation to answer this question...."

"On October 28, 1945, a case was filed in the Superior Court [that] asked that the Superior Court determine the rights of all water producers in the West Coast Basin and to allocate the available water therein equitably among all of the water producers. "When this case was filed, your City Council employed the legal firm of Stewart, Shaw, and Murphy to defend the City of Inglewood on this action. ... I quote from a letter received by the City Council from Arvin B. Shaw, Jr.: 'I believe that there is a reasonable ground to hope to establish for the City of Inglewood, a preferred position, based on priority of water rights as an appropriator of water for many years....""

"Some time prior to the filing of a California Water Service Company suit, there had been pending in another section of Los Angeles County a case known as the 'Raymond Basin Case.' This case was in many points substantially similar to the one in which we were being sued. The substantial and pertinent portion of the Superior Court decision was to the effect that all water users from a common basin must be treated exactly alike. "On May 10, a conference participated in by William Renshaw, water engineer, F. R. Coop, administrative officer, and myself, was held with Arvin B. Shaw. ... While much of the information given us by Shaw was in confidence, I have received his permission to quote from a confidential letter as follows: "The decision of the Supreme Court in the Pasadena case, however, is to my mind, clear to the effect that you would not be given priority and that all overlying users in the West Basin, as well as appropriators, would be treated on an equal basis of right; in substance, would be required to prorate water production downward to a point which is within the safe yield of the Basin."

19 A major factor in the success of the committee was that T. B. Cosgrove was appointed to it; he was the attorney for the Dominguez Corporation and other related firms. Prior to his appointment to the Settlement Committee, he had vigorously fought against the litigation and strongly articulated a position that the Dominguez rights were superior to those of the others using the basin. No
Notes to pp. 121-3

in the path of the saltwater wedge moving at an accelerated rate toward the pumping trough beneath Hawthorne. Standard Oil had already reduced its own water withdrawals severely in 1952, because it feared that salt water would soon engulf its well lying between Hawthorne and the sea. Under the interim agreement, Standard Oil pumped about two-thirds of its "rights." El Segundo also was not pumping its full rights during that time period, for the same reason. The city of Inglewood, lying to the north of Hawthorne and inland, was not threatened by immediate saltwater intrusion, but Inglewood's pumping costs were considerably increased as a result of the lowered water table.

24 In September of 1957, for example, officials from Torrance, Inglewood, and El Segundo met with representatives of the city of Hawthorne "in an effort to persuade the City of Hawthorne to become a part of the Interim Agreement and petition to curtail pumping." The Inglewood official reporting on the meeting stated that "Hawthorne City officials had indicated that they would take the matter under consideration but that press releases implied that there was small likelihood that the City would become a party to the Agreement" (WBWA, Executive Committee, minutes, July 12, 1957, p. 4).

25 Many of the small producers had abandoned their rights as imported water became generally available to the basin. Others had sold their rights to the larger producers once the interim agreement had been signed and an active market for water rights had developed.

26 The total expenditure for the watermaster service for 1985 in Raymond Basin was $112,471, and in West Basin $131,800 (Watermaster reports for 1985).

27 See Blomquist (1990) for a description of the process in the San Gabriel Basin. Participants in that basin adopted several of the cost-saving strategies developed in the Central Basin case. Blomquist is just now completing studies in three additional basins - San Fernando, Chino, and Mojave - in which legal and environmental conditions are quite different. No settlement has yet been reached in Mojave, where the asymmetries of the interests of various parties are far greater than in any of the other cases involved. See the discussion of the Mojave case in Chapter 5. The city of Los Angeles holds a preeminent water right in the San Fernando Valley, and the final court decision adjudicating rights in that basin is quite different from those in the basins that relied on mutual prescription. The settlement in Chino Basin was reached by producers drawing on the experiences of all of these other basins.

28 Carl Fossette, the executive director of both associations, as well as the director of the Upper San Gabriel Water Association, played a remarkable role in helping the water producers in all of these interlinked basins to change the structures of institutions affecting their behaviors. His importance derived from several factors: (1) The number of overlapping positions he held. In addition to his role as executive director of three private water associations, he eventually became the general manager of the West Basin Municipal Water District, the Central Basin Municipal Water District, the Upper San Gabriel Municipal Water District, and the Central and West Basin Water Replenishment District. (2) The duration of his activities. He was appointed to his first position in 1946 and continued an active role in all three of the basins until he retired in 1974. Even after retirement at age 67, he continued an active role as a director representing Central Basin on the board of directors of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, where he was vice-chairman during 1980-2 (Fossette and Fossette 1986, p. iv). (3) His tolerance for conflict and his commitment to conflict resolution. Fossette was able to sit through tough bargaining situations without losing his temper. The association maintained his repeated efforts to bring contesting parties together in informal working settings to try to work out mutually agreeable relationships, (4) His ability to represent the interests of West, Central, and San Gabriel water producers to external agencies, including California state legislators. Fossette became the chief advocate for proposals developed within these basins that needed support from countywide, regionwide, or statewide public agencies.

29 Markets for water rights have emerged in all of the southern California basins that used litigation to assign defined water shares to parties. In all of these cases, agricultural users have slowly sold their rights to water companies or utilities, who can utilize the rights to avoid building expensive surface storage facilities. See R. Smith (1988) for a discussion of the advantage of tradable water rights.

30 Interview by Elinor Ostrom with John Johams of the watermaster service, November 17, 1960.


32 The parties in Raymond Basin changed their watermaster in recent years; so the threat of a change is credible.

33 For a surface storage facility, one can empty and fill the reservoir frequently without harming the structure itself. The degrees of freedom in raising and lowering the water levels in a groundwater basin are considerably less than those involved in the use of a surface reservoir.

34 The possibilities included the Los Angeles County Flood Control District and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, both of which had decided interests in seeing that the water basins in the area were regulated. Water producers in West Basin and Central Basin wanted to cooperate with these larger agencies, but not be completely dependent on them.

35 The wide representation involved in this group led one observer of the process to comment that "the Committee of Twelve was made up of engineers, attorneys and representatives of irrigation districts, water districts, farm bureaus, cities, private utilities and the State of California itself. Into that group came a variety of viewpoints and a diversity of problems which was most beneficial. Instead of recommending solutions for particular areas or groups, the ideas of this committee were bound to be cross-sectional in their scope" (James K. Krieger, "Progress in Ground Water Replenishment," mimeograph April 15, 1955, p. 2).

36 In a report to the West Basin Water Association, Louis Alexander, a member of the "Committee of Twelve" active in both West Basin and Central Basin, stated that "the original concept for the bill was that an assessment on pumping only would be provided and ... no ad valorem tax would be permitted. ... [T]he farm element in the State had insisted upon an ad valorem tax rate provision and ... the present bill represents a compromise between the two points of view" (West Basin Water Association, minutes, April 12, 1955, p. 8). The president of the association had called a special meeting of the full associa-
in the path of the salinewater wedge moving at an accelerated rate toward the pumping trough beneath Hawthorne. Standard Oil had already reduced its own water withdrawals severely in 1952, because it feared that salt water would soon engulf its well lying between Hawthorne and the sea. Under the interim agreement, Standard Oil pumped about two-thirds of its "rights." El Segundo also was not pumping its full rights during that time period, for the same reason. The city of Inglewood, lying to the north of Hawthorne and inland, was not threatened by immediate saltwater intrusion, but Inglewood’s pumping costs were considerably increased as a result of the lowered water table.

24 In September of 1957, for example, officials from Torrance, Inglewood, and El Segundo met with representatives of the city of Hawthorne "in an effort to persuade the City of Hawthorne to become a part of the Interim Agreement and petition to curtail pumping." The Inglewood official reporting on the meeting stated that "Hawthorne City officials had indicated that they would take the matter under consideration but that press releases implied that there was small likelihood that the City would become a party to the Agreement" (WBWA, Executive Committee, minutes, July 12, 1957, p. 4).

25 Many of the small producers had abandoned their rights as imported water became generally available to the basin. Others had sold their rights to the larger producers once the interim agreement had been signed and an active market for water rights had developed.

26 The total expenditure for the watermaster service for 1985 in Raymond Basin was $112,471, and in West Basin $151,800 (Watermaster reports for 1985).

27 See Blomquist (1990) for a description of the process in the San Gabriel Basin. Participants in that basin adopted several of the cost-saving strategies developed in the Central Basin case. Blomquist is just now completing studies in three additional basins—San Fernando, Chino, and Mojave—in which legal and environmental conditions are quite different. No settlement has yet been reached in Mojave, where the asymmetries of the interests of various parties are far greater than in any of the other cases involved. See the discussion of the Mojave case in Chapter 5. The city of Los Angeles holds a preeminent water right in the San Fernando Valley, and the final court decision adjudicating rights in that basin is quite different from those in the Central Basin in mutual prescription. The settlement in Chino Basin was reached by producers drawing on the experiences of all of these other basins.

28 Carl Fossette, the executive director of both associations, as well as the director of the Upper San Gabriel Water Association, played a remarkable role in helping the water producers in all of these interlinked basins to change the structures of institutions affecting their behaviors. His importance derived from several factors: (1) The number of overlapping positions he finally held. In addition to his role as executive director of three private water associations, he eventually became the general manager of the West Basin Municipal Water District, the Central Basin Municipal Water District, the Upper San Gabriel Municipal Water District, and the Central and West Basin Water Replenishment District. (2) The duration of his activities. He was appointed to his first position in 1946 and continued an active role in all of the basins until he retired in 1974. Even after retirement at age 67, he continued an active role as a director representing Central Basin on the board of directors of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, where he was vice-chairman during 1980-2 (Fossette and Fossette 1986, p. iv). (3) His tolerance for conflict and his commitment to conflict resolution. Fossette was able to sit through tough bargaining situations without losing his temper. The association minutes document his repeated efforts to bring contesting parties together in informal working settings to try to work out mutually agreeable relationships. (4) His ability to represent the interests of West, Central, and San Gabriel water producers to external agencies, including California state legislators. Fossette became the chief advocate for proposals developed within these basins that needed support from countywide, regionwide, or statewide public agencies.

29 Markets for water rights have emerged in all of the southern California basins that used litigation to assign defined water shares to parties. In all of these cases, agricultural users have slowly sold their rights to water companies or utilities, who can utilize the rights to avoid building expensive surface storage facilities. See R. Smith (1988) for a discussion of the advantage of tradable water rights.

30 Interview by Elinor Ostrom with John Johans of the watermaster service, November 17, 1960.


32 The parties in Raymond Basin changed their watermaster in recent years; so the threat of a change is credible.

33 For a surface storage facility, one can empty and fill the reservoir frequently without harming the structure itself. The degrees of freedom in raising and lowering the water levels in a groundwater basin are considerably less than those involved in the use of a surface reservoir.

34 The possibilities included the Los Angeles County Flood Control District and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, both of which had decided interests in seeing that the water basins in the area were regulated. Water producers in West Basin and Central Basin wanted to cooperate with these larger agencies, but not be completely dependent on them.

35 The wide representation involved in this group led one observer of the process to comment that "the Committee of Twelve was made up of engineers, attorneys and representatives of irrigation districts, water districts, farm bureaus, cities, private utilities and the State of California itself. Into that group came a variety of viewpoints and a diversity of problems which was most beneficial. Instead of recommending solutions for particular areas or groups, the ideas of this committee were bound to be cross-sectional in their scope" (James K. Krieger, "Progress in Ground Water Replenishment," mimeograph April 15, 1955, p. 2).

36 In a report to the West Basin Water Association, Louis Alexander, a member of the "Committee of Twelve" active in both West Basin and Central Basin, stated that "the original concept for the bill was that an assessment on pumping only would be provided and ... no ad valorem tax would be permitted. ... [T]he farm element in the State had insisted upon an ad valorem tax rate provision and ... the present bill represents a compromise between the two points of view" (West Basin Water Association, minutes, April 12, 1955, p. 8). The president of the association had called a special meeting of the full associa-
tion to consider a draft of both pieces of legislation before he acted to approve the final draft within the Committee of Twelve. At that meeting, he and other members of the Committee of Twelve were asked many questions and sub­ jected to some criticism for not having accomplished all that the members of the association had wanted, but the members finally voted unanimously to support the drafts.

37 James Krieger explained that provision in the following way: “Certain existing public agencies believed that they had the facilities to accomplish replenishment. Some of these agencies had the facilities to replenish groundwater basins, but no means of raising funds to purchase the water to do the replenishment. They felt that they should be permitted to do the job, and that no new public corporation should usurp their functions” (Progress in Ground Water Replenishment, mimeograph, April 15, 1955, p. 6).

38 In other words, if the district comprised only West Basin, then the West Basin producers could sue the Central Basin producers to pressure them into curtailing their production. If the Central Basin producers controlled the district, they might not let the district initiate legal proceedings against them.

39 Each of these agencies had substantial threat power over the proponents of the new districts, because the boundaries of the proposed district had to be approved by the Departments of Water and Power in the state of California, and had to be approved by the voters. Significant opposition at either stage would sub­ stantially raise the costs of gaining approval and threaten the likelihood of approval. Among the issues that had to be resolved at that stage of the negotia­ tions was the formula for distributing the costs of replenishment. The city of Los Angeles, for example, strongly opposed any imposition of a property tax on its residents to pay for the construction of the barrier, because its taxpayers had borne a higher burden through the years to pay for imported water, while the taxpayers in the other cities had received the benefit of much lower water costs. By using “zones-of-benefit districts” within the Los Angeles County Flood Control District, locations of the city of Los Angeles, to pay for barrier construction, a cost-distribution formula was developed that was agreeable to all parties.

40 The costs are also less than the total operating costs in neighboring Orange County, where producers did not litigate their water rights, but instead developed only a replenishment program without any control over withdrawal rates. The focus of their management program, therefore, has been entirely on the “supply side” of the equation (Blomquist 1987a).

41 The story of this negotiation is extremely interesting, and it illustrates the vitality and creativity of a polycentric public-enterprise system. See E. Ostrom (1965) for a detailed discussion of the early process, and see more recent reports of the Central and West Basin Water Replenishment District for later developments.

42 A reader might wonder why a flood-control district would be in the business of supplying replenishment services in the first place. When the Los Angeles Flood Control District was first established in 1915, it was given strong powers over both flood control and water conservation. Once it had lined most of the rivers in the county, the district emphasized water conservation in an effort to maintain its survival as a large-scale engineering firm in the public arena.

43 Several private firms in the area serve as the watermasters for other basins; so

Notes to pp. 129–35
37 Buchanan (1975, p. 59), who characterizes the origin of a constitution as the point in the development of complex technologies; see Rosenberg (1982) and Nelson and Winter (1982). Because this is a dynamic process of selecting among various rules, it is likely to have aspects of path dependence similar to those of technological change (Arthur 1989, David 1985).

52 The process described here is somewhat similar to the “learning by doing” that occurs in the development of complex technologies; see Rosenberg (1982) and Nelson and Winter (1982). Because this is a dynamic process of selecting among various rules, it is likely to have aspects of path dependence similar to those of technological change (Arthur 1989, David 1985).

44 Those who have rights to the largest proportions of water to be withdrawn also pay the largest proportions of the pump tax, which is then used to replenish the basin and pay for the monitoring arrangements that exist. Property owners who have benefited from the provision of an effective water system in an arid region pay low property taxes to support the modest administrative structure involved. Because the rules were devised basin by basin, they are tailored quite specifically to the unique aspects of each groundwater basin.

45 The process described here is somewhat similar to the “learning by doing” that occurs in the development of complex technologies; see Rosenberg (1982) and Nelson and Winter (1982). Because this is a dynamic process of selecting among various rules, it is likely to have aspects of path dependence similar to those of technological change (Arthur 1989, David 1985).

46 This is another application of Selten’s equity principle; see note 7.

47 All rules share a common syntax: Defined persons with particular attributes filling specific positions are (required, forbidden, or permitted) to take named actions under specified conditions.

48 See von Wright (1951, 1963) for an introduction to the foundations of deontic logic. The modal form of the three deontic operators is as follows: must not (forbid), must (require), and may (permit). John R. Commons continually used these modal operators to characterize the basic structure of working rules (Commons 1917).

49 See, for example, the discussion by Shimanoff (1980, pp. 43–46) regarding why permission should not be included as a deontic operator to define rules.

50 This distinction characterizes my previous work (E. Ostrom 1985b).

51 See Buchanan (1975, p. 59), who characterizes the origin of a constitution as a “leap out of the anarchistic jungle.”

52 Any change in the parts of the syntax of a rule, identified in note 47, would constitute a change in a rule. Rules can change without producing changes in the outcomes likely to be produced in the resulting situation. Following Gard­ ner and E. Ostrom (1990), I reserve the term “reform” for a change in a rule that produces a new outcome preferred to the outcome produced prior to the change in the rule.

5. ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES AND FRAGILITIES

1 Rent dissipation is defined in Chapter 2 in the section “Appropriation Prob­ lems.”

2 Central-government encouragement and even financing of “modern” fishing vessels have caused similar conflicts between inshore and offshore fishers in many other locations. See McGoodwin (1980) for a description of this prob­ lem in Mexico. Dasgupta (1982, p. 17) describes how modern fishing vessels in India have been able to ignore historical rights of traditional inshore fishers.

3 William Blomquist (1989) describes this case in considerable detail, and I am much indebted to him for his insights and analysis based on his fieldwork.

4 The Karave case is known for being entrepreneurial and oriented toward trading and other forms of acquiring wealth: “Nor was caste a significant barrier against the conversion of economic gains into social mobility. . . . The
5 A description of the way these nets are used is provided later.

6 One way to think of what happened is illustrated in Figure 5.2. Prior to the increase in the price of fish, the marginal and average returns to be derived from the use of each additional net can be represented by MR and AR. With a uniform marginal cost of constructing a net, fishermen would have maximized their economic return by constructing X1 nets, where the marginal return would equal marginal cost. Because they were already dissipated rent before the price increase, the fishermen probably were close to the point where average return would intersect the marginal-cost curve, say X2. When a substantial increase in the price occurred, both the marginal-return and average-return curves would be shifted dramatically upward. The optimal economic return would then be at X3. It would appear that the fishermen were constructing new nets beyond that point, say at X4. They may not have suffered full rent dissipation because shares in the nets were still actively sought. Full rent dissipation would occur at X5. So the lure of continuing profits (even with negative marginal returns) would always tempt more fishermen to enter. This analysis was developed in a very useful discussion with Jimmy Walker.

7 No matter how well a set of rules operates under one set of environmental and economic conditions, major changes - such as the price for a resource unit quadrupling - represent a substantial challenge to the capacity of an old set of rules to continue to produce outcomes that are efficient and fair.

8 Up to 1972, only Taiwan, Japan, and Korea experienced more rapid growth in the yield of paddy rice (N. T. Uphoff, personal communication).

9 The introduction of high-yield varieties has, in some villages, been associated with lower, rather than higher, yields (Byrne 1986).

10 This is not to imply that the participants are permanently trapped in this set of incentives, even though the social and political structures generating these incentives are difficult to change. It is particularly poignant that such vicious circles have been created in a country with a rich and very long history of successful irrigation using a diversity of indigenous institutions (Gunasekera 1981; Leach 1961, 1980).

11 Leach describes the system in effect during the 1950s in a single village that depended on a much smaller restored bund: "Whenever the Old Field is to be cultivated it is essential for the whole village to adhere closely to a predetermined program of work, for when the tank sluices are open the whole field can take water and when the sluices are shut the whole field must run dry. No plowing can be done on a dry field, but once the water has been let in to soften the earth, work must proceed everywhere simultaneously. Thereafter, to avoid loss by evaporation, the plowed fields must be sown and the crops carried through to harvest with the least possible delay. "There must, therefore, be agreement about the dates on which the sluice will be opened, the date at which sowing will be completed, the varieties of rice that will be sown, and the dates at which it is planned to have harvest ready and the field drained. Under rules in force in 1954 the Village Cultivation Officer held a village meeting at the beginning of each cultivation season and formally agreed on these various dates with the assembled villagers" (Leach 1980, p. 108). Leach reports that this strict regimen was actually followed while he was there.

12 The British authorities were quite uncertain about what type of administrative and judicial arrangements they should establish, and they organized and re-organized both the administrative and conflict-resolution mechanisms related to irrigation several times during British rule. At each change, a key debate focused on how much authority could be entrusted to "native" tribunals or administrative officials. See Roberts (1980) for an excellent review of the 1836–71 period of British rule in Ceylon.

13 The recurring necessity for the exertion of considerable effort by British AGAs is revealed in a report by Edward Elliott, an AGA from 1863 to 1896, supervising a number of smaller irrigation systems (among other tasks). His report for 1871, as quoted by Roberts (1980, p. 200), contained the following: "Each year shows that incessant personal attention on the part of the Assistant Agent is necessary to carry out irrigation works by villages; to simply order the . . . Headmen to carry out any work may sound very fine, but, practically, the results are small, unless the Headmen be encouraged and supported by the Assistant Agent taking an active interest in their efforts; if the villagers see this and know that once they agree to any undertaking, everyone must contribute and that no shirking is allowed, all will combine cheerfully to carry out the work. But endless watching and numerous inspections are necessary."

14 Water meetings of this type have occurred in Sri Lanka for centuries (Gunasekera 1981). See the discussion of these institutions by Uphoff (1983).

15 The earlier land-tenure system in some parts of Sri Lanka had greatly reduced the level of conflict between head-enders and tail-enders, on the smaller tanks at least. The fields to be irrigated from a tank were laid out and assigned in
such a way that each farmer was assigned one block of land to farm in the top third of the area to be irrigated, another block in the middle section, and one block in the lower section. Thus, all farmers had a motivation to try to find ways of getting water to the tail end of the system. Further, when water shortages required a cutback, it was relatively easy to decide not to water the bottom third of the fields. Everyone participated in the sharing of this risk, and the mechanism for determining which fields would be watered was built into the design of the fields themselves (Leach 1961, 1980).

16 Fladby describes the patterns of interaction on a tract in Kiritindi Oya during the early 1980s in the following manner: “The directing of water in [the minor agricultural season, when water is the scarcest] is similar to an early 19th century diplomatic Major Power game: No rules are sacred, alliances are formed, every move is answered with a counter-move and in the long run the only guiding line is self-interest. The role of the authorities is like that of an ineffectual trans-national organization . . . with some formal power, but without means to enforce it” (Fladby 1983, p. 191).

17 The increasingly partisan nature of the relationship between MPs and district administrative systems is described by Craig (1981).

18 A report by A. T. Corey (1986) lays out some of the severe problems faced on the huge Mahaweli set of projects planned to develop or improve water supply for 900,000 acres of land for over 200,000 new settlers (Jayawardene 1986). Among the problems Corey notes related to “Turnout Area H” are these: (1) Of the 119 allotments in the area, only 83 had received water during the year of his investigation. (2) Of those 83, only 49 received water through authorized project outlets; the rest obtained water through unauthorized cuts. (3) Rotation of water, where practiced at all, was haphazard. (4) An unauthorized breach was taking all of the water from one ditch, even though the downstream farmer had notified authorities and was afraid to take further action for fear of being “hammered” by the offending farmer (Corey 1986, pp. 158–9; note 18).

19 The deputy director for water management in the Irrigation Department told one member of the Gal Oya project team that if they could make progress in Gal Oya, they “could make progress anywhere else in the country” (Uphoff 1985c, note 32).

20 In a personal communication, Norman Uphoff stresses that the decision to hire college graduates was initially taken to avoid hiring individuals with political connections, and the enhanced capacity of the IOs to communicate with the ID staff was an unforeseen but very positive consequence.

21 Exigencies in the field reduced the time available for data collection and pushed IOs into action earlier than planned.

22 Membership in FCOs and DCOs was at times a delicate issue, because many actual irrigators did not have legal claims to the water they used. A frequent accommodation to this problem was to involve all actual irrigators in the FCOs, and only legal irrigators in the DCOs. Some rotations had to be abandoned because farmers who “were using drainage water from the system for unimproved properties” were not considered to be legal irrigators (Corey 1986, p. 158; note 18).

23 Actually, farmer-representatives took the initiative to set up such area councils shortly after FCOs were formed and before many DCOs were in place. This was possible because the program was not implementing a preconceived “blue- print,” but wanted farmers to regard those organizations as their own and take responsibility for them.
Notes to pp. 175–96

tion of new technologies is accelerated, the relationship between the rules and technologies in use may become seriously unbalanced. This is particularly the case when the rules have come about through long processes of trial and error and fishers do not possess legal powers to devise new rules and get them enforced. A focus on "production costs" alone, rather than on the total of production costs, transaction costs, and enforcement costs, leads to a narrow interpretation of efficiency (North 1986a,b). The rapid introduction of a "more efficient" technology by an outside authority can trigger the very "tragedy of the commons" that the same public officials presume will occur if they do not regulate the use of these fisheries. See Cordell and McKean (1986) for a discussion of the effects of the subsidization of a new technology on the fishery system of the local rules.

31 Such a vested system would need to be relatively complex and involve autonomy and exposure to scrutiny by external authorities regarding the legitimacy of the local rules.

6. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF SELF-ORGANIZING AND SELF-GOVERNING CPRs

1 If the only anomalies were the cases described in this book, one could overlook a few cases that could not be explained. But these cases were selected to be illustrative of many others that are similarly difficult to explain using current theories.


3 For an insightful discussion of situational analysis, see Fitt (1985).

4 Heckathorn and Mauer (1987) stress that in many institutional-choice situations the decision is not between one alternative and the status quo rules, but rather among a series of proposed alternatives. They recommend that one view the process of narrowing the alternatives as a bargaining process. This is a useful way of understanding the elimination of various alternative sets of rules, but the final decision is between the best alternative set that individuals identify and expose to scrutiny by external authorities according to the legitimacy of the local rules.

5 That there is always a set of status quo rules (see discussion in Chapter 4) and that they remain in effect until changed helps to clarify the final choice made in these situations at any particular time. That a set of status quo rules will stay in effect until changed also stabilizes the structure of operational situations. A new set of rules must be perceived as generating more benefits than costs to at least a minimum winning coalition (whatever that may be) in an institutional-choice situation.

6 This list is the result of my effort to understand what I have read in many case studies at a more general level. I presume that this list will be refined over time.
Notes to pp. 213–16

changes (Johnson and Libecap 1982; Karpoﬀ 1989; Welch 1983).

18 Where local institutions already exist and appropriators ﬁnd them to work well, given the problems they face, considerable resistance may be expected if other rules are imposed. Local appropriators may attempt to continue an “illegal” rule system for as long as they can make it viable, either because of lack of enforcement by central oﬃcials or because of the capacity to bribe central oﬃcials to ignore what is happening at the local level.

19 It is not just when external oﬃcials make rules that local appropriators try to present the facts of local situations in their favor. One can expect that tendency in all cases. But it will be diﬃcult for a set of appropriators to convince others who are familiar with the local circumstances of “facts” that are at variance with the experience and advantage of those others, whereas it will be easier to sell such “facts” to individuals who are not familiar with the local situation.

20 See, for example, Gardner and E. Ostrom (1990), where we model the eﬀects of four diﬀerent rule conﬁgurations used to organize appropriations activities in inshore ﬁsheries. There we compare equilibrium outcomes that are achieved when ﬁshers follow speciﬁc rules in diﬀerent physical environments. We do not claim to have developed a universal model of inshore ﬁshery environments, nor do we claim to have explored all relevant rule conﬁgurations. Because we are developing models guided by a general framework, we recognize the part of the general terrain to which our models are relevant. Within that terrain, we are able to make precise predictions about equilibria and the logical relationships among the variables overtly included in the model.

21 See the recent publications by V. Ostrom (1987, 1989, 1990) for examples in which the work of these scholars provides the foundation for modern political theory.

22 Readers are referred to the list of references for the many important recent works by Buchanan, Coase, North, Shepsle, and Williamson that are substantially adding to our understanding of how institutions work.

References


References


References


References


California State, Department of Water Resources, Report on Watermaster Service in West Coast Basin Watermaster Service Area, annual reports for water years 1944-5 through 1948-45.


References


Field, B. C. 1986. Induced Changes in Property-Rights Institutions. Research paper series 86–1, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.


Friedland, B. 1986. Induced Changes in Property-Rights Institutions. Research paper series 86–1, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.


References

Simulation and Games 18:443–57.
References


Shepsle, K. A 1979b. The Role of Institutional Structure


Scott, A. D. 1985. Coordination Versus Prisoner’s Dilemma: Implications for Inter­


Selten, R. 1978b. The Equity Principle in Economic Behavior. In

Selten, R. 1975. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points


Smith, R. J. 1981. Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private


Scott, A. D. 1982. Regulation and the Location of Jurisdictional Powers: The


Scott, A. D. 1982. Regulation and the Location of Jurisdictional Powers: The


References

Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.

Smith, R. J. 1981. Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private


Shepsle, K. A. 1979b. The Role of Institutional Structure


Scott, A. D. 1982. Regulation and the Location of Jurisdictional Powers: The


References


References

Index
Index

Index

design principles (continued) 179-81, 185
collective-choice arrangements, 93-99, 136, 179-81, 186
congressional resolutions, 27-31, 186, 237-8

INDEX

design principles (continued) 179-81, 185
collective-choice arrangements, 93-99, 136, 179-81, 186
congressional resolutions, 27-31, 186, 237-8

INDEX

design principles (continued) 179-81, 185
collective-choice arrangements, 93-99, 136, 179-81, 186
congressional resolutions, 27-31, 186, 237-8
graduated sanctions, 94-100, 136, 180, 186
minimal recognition of rights to organize, 101-2, 136, 180, 186
nested enterprises, 101-2, 136, 180, 186
discount rates, 34-5, 37-8, 89, 206-9, 219n31

INDEX

design principles (continued) 179-81, 185
collective-choice arrangements, 93-99, 136, 179-81, 186
congressional resolutions, 27-31, 186, 237-8
graduated sanctions, 94-100, 136, 180, 186
minimal recognition of rights to organize, 101-2, 136, 180, 186
nested enterprises, 101-2, 136, 180, 186
discount rates, 34-5, 37-8, 89, 206-9, 219n31

INDEX

design principles (continued) 179-81, 185
collective-choice arrangements, 93-99, 136, 179-81, 186
congressional resolutions, 27-31, 186, 237-8
graduated sanctions, 94-100, 136, 180, 186
minimal recognition of rights to organize, 101-2, 136, 180, 186
nested enterprises, 101-2, 136, 180, 186
discount rates, 34-5, 37-8, 89, 206-9, 219n31

INDEX

design principles (continued) 179-81, 185
collective-choice arrangements, 93-99, 136, 179-81, 186
congressional resolutions, 27-31, 186, 237-8
graduated sanctions, 94-100, 136, 180, 186
minimal recognition of rights to organize, 101-2, 136, 180, 186
nested enterprises, 101-2, 136, 180, 186
discount rates, 34-5, 37-8, 89, 206-9, 219n31

INDEX

design principles (continued) 179-81, 185
collective-choice arrangements, 93-99, 136, 179-81, 186
congressional resolutions, 27-31, 186, 237-8
graduated sanctions, 94-100, 136, 180, 186
minimal recognition of rights to organize, 101-2, 136, 180, 186
nested enterprises, 101-2, 136, 180, 186
discount rates, 34-5, 37-8, 89, 206-9, 219n31

INDEX
Luce, D. R., 217n1
Lumsden, M., 3
Lundqvist, J., 159, 240n18
Luzon Island, Philippines, 83
Maa, A., 70-80, 135, 149-50, 222n16, 224n2
external, 17, 44
mutual, 18, 44-5, 59, 85, 183-7, 222n21
see also design principles, monitoring
Monnegre River, 78
Montesquieu, C., 216
Moore, J. A., 218n5
Moore, M. P., 164-5
Musuro, G., 49
Murcia, Spain
insurta of, 76-8, 80-2, 92, 180, 205
see also Spanish huertas
Orozco, D. S., 218n13
Ostrom, E., 47, 50-1, 54-5, 104, 112, 139-40, 220n20, 221n4, 222n36, 223-29, 231n5, 233n30, 237n52, 242n20
Ostrom, V., 31, 55, 221n4, 222n15, 224n21
outcome
Pereto-inferior, 5
Pareto-optimal, 5
patterns of, 23
Palos Verdes Peninsula, California, 114
Palos Verdes Water Company, 114-15
Panayotou, T., 23
Parker, D. E., 228n27
Passadena, California, 114-15, 116, 124, 230n6, 234n21
see also California groundwater basins
Peregrin, D., 225n10
Perregaard, J., 167, 170-1
Philip II of Spain, 81, 227n21
Philippine Code, 85
Philippine zanjeras, 59-61, 82-9, 102, 184-5, 194-5, 228n27, 229n32, 241n26
Phyllis, 205, 218n6, 241n27
Picard, A. C., 3
Picht, C., 55, 64
Pinkerton, E. C., 23, 228-9, 232n18, 234n22
Plott, C. R., 30
Pocock, D., 228n6
policy analysis, 23-6, 191-2
policy prescriptions as metaphors, 21-3, 77
policy space, 142
Pock, J., 5
Popper, K. R., 38
Port Lameron Harbour, Nova Scotia, 173-7, 179-80
see also Nova Scotian inshore fisheries
Pradhan, B. N., 228n33
prescriptive rights, 108-9, 119, 233n20, 222n16
Price, M., 225n7

Keesing, F. M., 82
Kepler, J., 34
Kimber, R., 217n1
Kimoto, G., 257-8
Kirk, J. L., 30, 54-5
Kisikoglu, M., 218n6
Kleint, H., 219n14
Klein, J., 228n25
Koehle, A. R., 24
Korea, 238n8
Kornhauer, L., 233n21
Korten, D. C., 241n26
Korten, F. F., 241n26
Kreps, D. M., 7, 43, 221n10
Krugman, P., 3, 5
Krieger, J. K., 110, 235n35, 159, 240n18, 236n37
Kumita, M., 66-7

Latin America, 81
law of the Sea Convention,” 176
Leach, E., 239n10, 211, 239-40n15
LeBlanc, R., 219n10
Levinson, W., 219n18
levels of analysis, 50-3
collective choice, 55-3
constitutional choice, 53-5
operational choice, 50, 53-5
Levshin, D., 228n10
Levi, M., 94-5, 222n5, 218n11
Levitan, R., 218n6
Levine, G., 158
Lewis, H. T., 82
Lewin, R. T., 93, 95
Libecap, G. D., 89, 210, 243-4n17
licensing, 176-7
Lipson, A. J., 105, 231n8
Lloyd, F. W., 3
Long Beach, California, 130
Los Angeles, California, 110, 130, 160, 230n4, 231n8, 232n18, 234n27, 236n19
see also California groundwater basins
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, 115, 127, 132, 134-5, 233n34, 234n22
Los Angeles County Flood Control District, 115, 127, 132, 134-5
Los Angeles County Sanitation Districts, 134
lottery systems, 65, 67, 77, 19-20, 173, 241n27

Index

Zulu, P. M., 70
Zulch, D. R., 217n1
Zumpe, K. L., 175, 185, 222n21, 224n2
Zuver, T., 219n10

Index

Törbel, Switzerland (continued) see also Swiss alpine commons
Tormos Canal, 225-6n14
Torrance, California, 116-17, 234n24
Townsend, R., 48
transaction costs, 61, 65, 190-1
transformation costs, 40, 52, 140-1, 198-202, 209
Tribunal de las Aguas, 71-2, 74
Trost, K. K., 66
Truman, D. B. S., 5
Tubelis, G., 222n20
Tucker, A. W., 217n1
Tullock, G., 198, 201, 223n27
Turia River, 71
Turkish inshore fisheries, 143-6
Tversky, A., 208
Uda Walawe Scheme, Sri Lanka, 158 see also Sri Lankan irrigation systems uncertainty, 13, 34, 33, 39-40, 88, 207-9 due to lack of knowledge, 33-4, 109-10 due to strategic behavior, 33-4, 109-10 sources of, 33
United States Geological Survey, 115, 139
United States Supreme Court, 114
Uphoff, N. T., 163, 167, 170-1, 220n21, 223n19, 239n14, 240n19, n20, n22, 241n24, n25
Upper San Gabriel Municipal Water District, 130, 234-5n28
Upper San Gabriel Water Association, 234-5n28
White Cross, 226n15
Williamson, O. E., 36, 41, 219n15, 219n16, 220n23, 221n13, 221-2n14, 222n18, 242n2, 244n22 Wilson, J. A., 48 Wilson, R., 3, 7, 43, 93, 221n10 Winne, S., 50, 237n45 Winthofel, K. A., 228n25 Wolf, E. R., 224n4 World Bank, 228n27 Wright, K., 113, 116 Wynne, S., 55, 220n1
Yamanaka, Japan, 66-9, 99 see also Japanese mountain commons Yang, T. S., 55 Yelling, J. A., 224n3

280
The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market has been uniformly successful in solving common-pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore the conditions under which common-pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved.

Dr. Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the propositions of the "tragedy of the commons" argument, common-pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forest, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.

Governing the Commons makes a major contribution to the analytical literature on institutions and to our understanding of human cooperation.

Elinor Ostrom is co-director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis and professor of political science at Indiana University.